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INTRODUCTION 
This research constitutes a (natural) follow-up to an earlier published 
research paper in which I assessed, through data analysis, the effects of the 
Paris-TRIPS Conventional Trademark Régime (“CTR”) on countries.1  In 
that research I devised and applied the Trademark Potential concept.  
Using that concept I demonstrated that if a country has an inherent 
Trademark Deficit because of the structure of its industry, the CTR cannot 
effectively benefit that country's economy.  My empirically-based research 
has shown that the Trademark Potential of a country is not contingent upon 
its laws’ compatibility with CTR.  I have established that CTR compliant 
laws do not necessarily facilitate market entry for newcomers originating in 
developing countries.  Thus, in that research I have refuted the existence of 
some of the benefits that are generally associated with CTR. 
This present research is geared towards considering various avenues 
for remedying the pitfalls of the CTR by introducing a NeoConventional 
Trademark Régime (“NCTR”).  The aim of this proposed régime would be 
to facilitate the creation and market entry of brands originating in 
developing countries into their respective national markets and beyond.  In 
this regard, this research constitutes the culmination of my earlier research 
because it transcends the diagnostic role pertaining to the CTR and 
ventures into the realm of offering workable solutions thereto. 
 
 * Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law.  This article was written while I was 
a Cegla Fellow.  My sincere thanks go to the Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of 
the Law at the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, for its support of this research project.  
I also thank Hanoch Dagan, Ariel Porat, Michael Birnhack, Assaf Likhovski, Katya Assaf, 
Martin Adelman, Neil Wilkof and Guy Pessach for their valuable comments and ideas. 
 1. Amir H. Khoury, “Measuring the Immeasurable”—The Effects of Trademark 
Regimes:  A Case Study of Arab Countries, 26 J.L. & COM. 11, 11 (2006-2007). 
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SECTION ONE:  A CATALYST FOR THE RESEARCH 
For some decades now, literature has produced contradictory views as 
to the effects of “global” intellectual property protection on developing 
countries.  While this concern has been widely recognized in the context of 
patents, it has been less discernible in the trademark sphere.2  Generally, in 
the latter field the core of this body of research has been about enhancing 
the competitiveness of developing countries through the utilization of 
national trademark law.  Here, the proponents of the adoption of present 
day (conventional) standards of trademark protection contend that those 
constitute an essential tool for stimulating commercial activity and fair 
dealing.3  This position is based on the Modernization (Development) 
theory, according to which non-industrialized countries can only develop 
through the adoption of norms that have been created by developed 
countries.4  It follows that developing countries should adopt the legal 
norms and standards of trademark protection that have ultimately helped in 
 
 2. See generally Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local 
Innovation?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 309 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman eds., 2005) (suggesting that stronger intellectual property rights may not 
stimulate local innovation, but rather can lead to welfare losses in developing countries that 
strengthen their IP regimes, as well as more rapid deployment of technology generated in 
the world’s research centers); Heinz Klug, Comment:  Access to essential medicines–
Promoting human rights over free trade and intellectual property claims, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME, supra, at 481 (arguing that in the debate over access to medicines there 
is a need to view the relationship between the different sources of law governing human 
rights, trade, and intellectual property rights in terms of the broader normative goals of 
international legal order); Timothy Swanson and Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution:  
The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological Enforcement within the Biotechnology 
Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra, at 669, 670 (“Technological 
enforcement of proprietary rights in biotechnological innovations will result in uniformly 
and universally enforced rights in those innovations.  These rights should generate enhanced 
returns to innovation, but at the cost of reduced rates of diffusion.”). 
 3. See Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting 
“Irrational Beliefs”, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007) (concluding in part that producers 
should be able to command different prices for physically identical products bearing 
different marks without being subject to antitrust liability or inquiry). 
 4. See ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL 
COUNTRIES 6 (1996) (commenting that supporters of the “modernization” approach consider 
it to be the only viable choice for those nations aspiring for industrialization and 
technological transformation).  In this context, a “development” theory rationalization might 
be that it is only a matter of time before developing brands catch up with other brands of 
industrial countries because developing brands and marks are a relatively recent 
phenomenon, unlike many of the American counterparts that have emerged almost a century 
ago.  Id.  Many of the well-known American brands in use today emerged very early on in 
the past century.  Id. 
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advancing developed countries to where they are today.5  Others do not 
accept this view and submit that in the case of developing countries, the 
trademark system merely benefits foreign brand owners.  Here, 
Dependency theorists contend that applying modern standards of trademark 
protection to developing countries will render those countries evermore 
dependent on foreign brands and would not help generate new local 
brands.6 
1.1 The "Law in Action" and the "Trademark Potential" Concept 
This present research constitutes a (natural) follow-up to an earlier 
published research paper in which I examined, through data analysis, the 
effects of the Conventional Trademark Régime (as embodied in the Paris-
TRIPS system) on countries.7  In that research I argued that the effects of 
the Conventional Trademark Régime (“CTR”) should be assessed within 
the parameters of the Trademark Potential concept.  According to that 
concept, the Trademark Potential of a country is contingent on the type of 
industry therein, and not on the level of compliance of its trademark law 
with norms and standards that are prescribed by the CTR.  To substantiate 
my claims, I presented empirical evidence highlighting the lack of national 
utilization of trademark laws in developing countries.  From my previous 
research I have been able to draw the following conclusions: 
1)  Developing countries lag behind developed countries in all 
spheres of trademark use, namely the “Absolute,” “Relative,” and 
“Particular.”  Specifically, developing countries are at a 
disadvantage in terms of actual (Absolute) trademark registration 
both within their respective jurisdictions and beyond.  Not only is 
the number of registrations much smaller than the comparable 
numbers in developed countries, but also the “relative” share of 
non-resident owned marks that are registered in developing 
countries is much higher than the share of non-resident 
registrations in developed countries.  Furthermore, the “particular 
level” indicates that brands originating in developed countries 
dominate “foreign registrations” in developing countries.  
Significantly, my findings indicate a consistent pattern since the 
1970s. 
 
 5. As such, achieving their own growth is very tempting to developing countries. 
 6. See Daniel Chudnovsky, Foreign Trademarks in Developing Countries, 7 WORLD 
DEV. 663 (1979) (arguing that trademarks used by foreign manufacturers in developing 
countries force domestic enterprises to either accept a reduced share of the market or enter 
into license agreements with the foreign manufacturers, the latter still forcing the domestic 
enterprise to lose goodwill development and result in net social costs to the domestic 
country). 
 7. Khoury, supra note 1, at 22. 
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2) The ability to create new trademarks in any country is 
inherently correlated to the economic and commercial structure 
of that country.  Thus, the Trademark Potential of a country is 
directly affected by the composition and structure of the 
country’s economy.8  The Trademark Potential concept provides 
an analytical tool that would help predict future trademark use in 
developing countries. 
 
3) Where a country has an inherent Trademark Deficit, because 
of the structure of its industry, no trademark law (no matter how 
CTR-compliant) can effectively boost its Trademark Potential 
and ultimately improve its national industry's ability to enter the 
market under its own brands. 
 
4) While developed countries enjoy a robust manufacture-
oriented economy with a trademark surplus and a high 
Trademark Potential, developing economies are extractive 
economies, with exports dominated by raw materials such as oil.9  
Thus, due to their economic orientation, the respective 
Trademark Potential of developing countries remains negligible. 
 
5)  Where national production manifests a very low Trademark 
Potential (due to its focus on primitive or raw products), there is 
no environment for fostering national brands. 
 
6) Products and services that dominate the economy of 
developing countries have a very low Trademark Potential.10  
 
 8. In this regard, a given country or region might participate in world trade within any 
of three sectors or a combination thereof, namely:  primary raw materials, manufactured 
products, or intangible services, each of which has a different “trademark potential.”  See 
LEE E. PRESTON, TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7 (1970) (suggesting such a tri-
sectoral distinction as the basis for analysis of a nation or region’s trade position in the 
world economy). 
 9. In complete contrast to the situation in developing countries, the U.S. economy has 
a mighty “trademark balance” and a very high trademark potential.  American corporations 
own many hundreds of thousands of marks.  See JAMES GERBER, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMICS 4 (2007) (contending that “the vast majority of goods and services we 
[Americans] consume are made at home.  Haircuts, restaurant meals, gardens, healthcare, 
education, financial services, utilities and most of our entertainment, to name a few, are 
domestic products.  In fact, about 87 percent of what we consume is made in the United 
States, since imports are equal to about 13 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP).”). 
 10. See U.N. Trade & Dev. Board of the Conf. on Trade & Dev. [TDBOR], 10th 
Special Sess., Geneva, Switz., Mar. 19, 1979, Report on the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the 
External Trade of the Least Developed Countries, 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/735, TD/B/AC.29/1 
(Feb. 12, 1979) (submitting that in order to achieve economic developments for developing 
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Thus, developing countries lack the ability to increase their 
respective shares of trademarks regardless of the strong 
protection that is afforded to marks by their national laws.  
Furthermore, the foreign franchising activity within developing 
countries and those countries' virtually non-existent shares in 
super-brands and Multi-National Corporations (“MNCs”), 
provide additional support for this conclusion. 
 
7)  The adoption and application of the CTR in a developing 
country with a low Trademark Potential does not reflect a willful 
sovereign action, but rather, is motivated by indirect benefits.  
Such adoption and application of legal norms constitutes no more 
than a dictated trade-off.  Indeed, trademark policy in developing 
countries appears to be driven by two primary concerns, namely, 
the loss of foreign investments and economic sanctions that may 
be imposed (within the WTO framework) as a result of 
insufficient protection for intellectual property rights.11 
 
Consequently, my previously published research proclaims that 
despite the adoption of CTR-compliant laws, developing countries will 
continue to experience a Trademark Deficit due to the inherently low 
Trademark Potential of their economies.  The trademark régime that has 
been adopted into the trademark laws of developing countries has failed to 
generate a change within the economic structure of these countries, and its 
function has been relegated to protecting brands that are mostly foreign-
owned and which dominate trademark registration therein.  Thus, in the 
case of trademark laws, the “law in books” and the “law in action” diverge 
rather than converge.12  Indeed, while similar laws may be enacted in 
 
countries it is necessary to expand export earnings and to reduce import costs). 
 11. Amir H. Khoury, Trademark Policy:  The Case of Arab Countries, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:  STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 299, 330 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007) (discussing Arab 
countries’ compliance with international trademark norms as being driven by the risks of 
losing foreign investment and economic sanctions for inadequate intellectual property 
protections). 
 12. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 17 (1910).  
Accord Assaf Likhovski, Czernowitz, Lincoln, Jerusalem, and the Comparative History of 
American Jurisprudence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 621, 625 n.9 (2003) (“This 
distinction was just one element in a new conception of law that emerged in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth century in opposition to what is 
sometimes called ‘formalist’ or ‘classical’ legal thought.  The new conception included 
rejection of the idea of law as a gapless geometric-like system in which specific rules can be 
abstractly deduced from general propositions; the notion of the legal order as embedded in 
society and emanating from ‘the people’ rather than from an all-powerful state headed by a 
sovereign (anti-positivism); a conviction that because law is a reflection of society, the 
academic study of law must be informed by the social sciences; an interest in non-state 
normative systems (legal pluralism); and, finally, an interest in the use of the law to mitigate 
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various countries, their impact on those countries is not homogeneous.  The 
CTR can affect different countries in different ways.  While developed 
countries can utilize the CTR to expand their dominance over the brand 
market, developing countries, due to their inherently low Trademark 
Potential, do not reap any defined equal benefits.  In this regard, one 
research study has concluded that similar intellectual property laws do not 
ensure similar results in different countries:  “[E]mpirical claims that IPRs 
can generate more international economic activity and greater indigenous 
innovation are conditional.  Other things being equal, such claims may be 
valid--but other things are not equal.  Rather, the positive impacts of IPRs 
seem stronger in countries with complementary endowments and 
policies.”13  Furthermore, it should be noted that indirect benefits such as 
foreign direct investments and participation in the WTO framework that 
accrue to developing countries, cannot offset the aforementioned 
deficiencies of the CTR and its chilling effect vis-à-vis facilitating the entry 
of newcomers into the brand market.  That is primarily because these 
indirect benefits are received by all countries that comply with WTO 
standards, notwithstanding their Trademark Potential.  In other words, 
those indirect benefits are not directed solely to developing countries as a 
payoff for their compromise in the intellectual property sector.  In this 
regard, the legal history of the WTO and of the drafting of the TRIPS 
Agreement unequivocally demonstrates that developing countries have not 
been real partners in the formulation of the WTO framework.14 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
In light of all of these findings, my belief is that change is needed.  To 
my mind, this change should be about recalibrating the CTR vis-à-vis the 
needs of current and prospective brand-owners originating in developing 
countries.  This would pave the way for the entry of “newcomers” into the 
branding scene.  Thus, this research is intended to address a single basic 
 
the flaws of liberal individualism.”). 
 13. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 199 
(Institute for International Economics 2000).  See also Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust 
of Intellectual Property Rights 5 (MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 02-04), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578563 (“While developed countries 
might have resources and regulatory mechanisms to reduce the impact of an unbalanced 
intellectual property system, such a system would substantially hurt less developed 
countries.  Many of these countries do not have the wealth, infrastructure, and technological 
base to take advantage of the opportunities created by the system.  Many of these countries 
also lack the national economic strengths and established legal mechanisms to overcome 
problems created by an unbalanced system.”). 
 14. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS (2d ed., Thompson Sweet & Maxwell 2003) (1998) (describing the drafting 
process for the TRIPS agreement). 
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question:  How should the CTR be modified or altered so as to offset the 
Trademark Deficit of developing countries and create fertile ground for 
fostering new brands originating in those countries? 
In this regard, the present research constitutes the culmination of my 
earlier work because it transcends the diagnostic role and ventures into the 
realm of offering workable solutions.  The purpose of this research, then, is 
to examine how trademark laws need to be reformulated so as to encourage 
newcomers and to create a level playing field.  In practical terms, my aim is 
to propose a new or modified regulatory environment in the form of a 
NeoConventional Trademark Régime that might help developing countries 
to penetrate the seemingly impregnable wall that separates the “haves” 
from the “have-nots” in the trademarking (branding) arena. 
My proposed modifications can be classified into two distinct 
categories.  The first category includes those modifications that completely 
deviate from the Conventional Trademark Régime.  The second category, 
which I favor, includes a bouquet of conforming yet pragmatic 
modifications that function within the CTR.  Those modifications would 
provide the impetus for a NCTR.  The comparison between those two 
categories is ultimately settled through a “cost-benefit” prism.  However, 
before embarking on the task of introducing a NCTR, there is a need to 
characterize the CTR and to understand its inner workings. 
SECTION TWO:  HALLMARKS OF THE CONVENTIONAL TRADEMARK 
RÉGIME 
Trademarks have long transcended their basic role of denoting the 
source of products and have been transformed into an economic asset in 
their own right.  Indeed, while the function of trademarks was originally 
limited to guaranteeing origin and ensuring the quality of products bearing 
the mark, over the years the trademark has mutated into a tool for 
advertising and marketing.15  Presently, leading and famous marks have 
acquired an independent commercial status that is distinct from the 
respective goods/services that they cover.16  They have become pivotal 
 
 15. See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 157, 168, 204-205 
(Dartmouth Publishing 1996) (discussing the history of the philosophy of intellectual 
property); ALISON FIRTH, TRADE MARKS THE NEW LAW 9-11 (Jordan Publishing Ltd. 1995) 
(describing the development of trademarks); Ida M. Azmi et al, Distinctive Signs and Early 
Markets:  Europe, Africa and Islam, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123 
(Alison Firth ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997) (describing trademark development in specific 
cultures); Patricia K. Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of 
a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297 (1998) (examining modern trademark use). 
 16. FIRTH, supra note 15, at 12; Liz Cratchley, The Brand Owner’s View, in 7 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11 (Norma Dawson & Alison Firth eds., Sweet 
& Maxwell 2000); see also Amir H. Khoury, Well-Known and Famous Trademarks in 
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commercial assets and in some cases even cultural icons.17  Expanding 
international trade and the ever-increasing use of trademarks (and service 
marks) have acted as catalysts for enhancing the international protection for 
these marks.18 
2.1 Trademarks between Local Law and International Standards 
Trademarks, much like other types of intellectual property rights, have 
received protection within a wide array of international, regional, and 
national agreements and laws.  The 1883 Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property was the first multilateral agreement 
intended to protect trademarks, as well as other forms of industrial property 
subject matter.  Since then, other treaties have been introduced, culminating 
in the Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).19  TRIPS requires member-states to establish a minimum level of 
intellectual property protection in their national law.  With respect to 
trademarks, TRIPS sets various standards, including:  the recognition of service 
marks; setting a minimum (renewable) term of protection; defining use 
requirements; and enhancing the role of customs in enforcement and 
recognizing well-known marks even if not registered in the specific 
jurisdiction.20  In addition, TRIPS allows for canceling the registration of a 
mark due to non-use (subject to exceptions).  TRIPS also confirms the right 
to use a mark without conditions, and regulates issues of licensing and 
assignment.  TRIPS specifies minimum standards of protection that are to 
be adopted by the national laws of all members of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).21  TRIPS has raised the minimum level of 
 
Israel:  TRIPS From Manhattan to the Dawn of a New Millennium!, 12(4) FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 991, 991 (2002) (discussing more on the regulative 
structure of well-known marks); Helen Norman, Schecter’s “The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection” Revisited, in 7 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 191 
(Norma Dawson & Alison Firth eds., Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) (exploring the use of 
trademarks as valuable marketing assets). 
 17. Jonathan E. Schroeder, Brand Culture:  Trade Marks, Marketing and Consumption, 
in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 161, 161-176 (Jane 
Ginsburg, Lionel Bently & Jennifer Davis eds., Cambridge University Press 2008). 
 18. Indeed, world trade in both goods and services has been growing.  In 1998, global 
trade in goods amounted to a staggering US$6.5 trillion dollars, and reportedly created 1.5 
million new jobs.  Likewise, trade in service has expanded, and in 1996 it amounted to 
US$1.2 trillion.  See BEVERLY M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 15 (Transnational Publishers 1998) (discussing the expansion of world trade). 
 19. See Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of Intellectual Property Law, 2 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1 (1998) (describing the evolution of international trademark agreements); see also 
GERVAIS, supra note 14 (describing the creation of the TRIPS agreement). 
 20. MASKUS, supra note 13, at 26.  See also Khoury, supra note 16, at 999 (discussing 
standards established by TRIPS on IPRs). 
 21. See JOHN JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
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protection in accordance with the standards set by developed countries.  It 
has revolutionized intellectual property protection because of its 
substantive rules, its effective harmonization of national intellectual 
property laws, and its ability to ensure the adoption and continued 
enforcement of these norms.  In all, the TRIPS Agreement constitutes the 
backbone of the CTR.  However, given the circumstances under which 
TRIPS had been formulated, it is possible to conclude that CTR has not 
been shaped in accordance with national interests, but rather is intertwined 
in the wider context of international trade.22  In other words, adopting 
modern standards of intellectual property protection is not simply a matter 
of choice, but rather, a matter of political and commercial necessity.  
According to research, this outcome can best be explained by 
understanding the distinct narratives relating to the creation of the TRIPS 
agreement, namely “bargain,” “coercion,” “ignorance,” and “self-
interest.”23 
 
RELATIONS 289-326 (3d ed., West Publishing Co.  1995) (noting that the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations lasted from 1986-1994 and resulted in a better-defined international 
organization).  The WTO stems from the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which was 
concluded in December of 1993.  Id.  These were signed by 100 states in April 1994.  Id.  
Since that date, the number of WTO members has risen to 153.  Id.  See also WTO, 
Members and Observer, http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited July 23, 2008) (providing more information on WTO membership).  It is worth 
noting that the WTO does not provide any definitions of what constitutes a “developed” or 
“developing” country.  Id.  Developing countries in the WTO are classified as such based on 
“self election.”  Id.  PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Kluwer Law International 2000).  Gallagher provides a list of the WTO members and 
indicates the countries that are “Least Developed.”  Id.  Gallagher also explains that this 
category of “Least Developed Countries” (“LDC”) is based on a United Nations 
Classification, whereby 48 countries are included in that category (30 of which are WTO 
members).  Id.  The WTO came into effect on January 1, 1995 and is regarded as the more 
sophisticated successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).  Id.  The 
WTO is perceived as a mechanism for facilitating and unifying international trade.  Id.  The 
WTO performs the following functions:  (1) Administration and implementation of the 
multilateral trade agreements that makeup the WTO; including those dealing with IP issues; 
(2) Providing a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; (3) Providing assistance to the 
resolution of international trade disputes; (4) Oversight of international trade policies; and 
(5) Cooperation with other international institutions involved in global economic policy 
making.  Id.  See generally Waincymer J., Settlement of Disputes Within the World Trade 
Organization:  A Guide to the Jurisprudence, 24 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1247 (2001) 
(discussing the aims and organs of dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization). 
 22. See JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 21, at 291, 885-92 (describing the process by 
which the TRIPS agreement was drafted, including multiple international compromises). 
 23. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 369 
(2006).  Yu contends that each of these narratives provides valuable insight into 
understanding the context in which the Agreement was created.  Id.  The article then 
explores why less-developed countries have been dissatisfied with the international 
intellectual property system and discusses the latest developments in the area, such as the 
recent WTO debacle in Cancun, the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements, and the increasing use of technological protection measures.  Id.  The article 
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The TRIPS agreement has now been equated with combating other 
impediments to trade, such as dumping and GATT-regulated subsidies.24  
This has been achieved by incorporating TRIPS within the World Trade 
Organization scheme and by subjecting related disputes to the WTO's 
dispute resolution mechanisms.25  In this regard, TRIPS varies greatly from 
past intellectual property agreements in that it provides “teeth” that help 
ensure its effective implementation and enforcement.26  In effect, countries 
are now subjected to a host of pressures, and as such have adopted the CTR 
 
concludes by offering suggestions on how less-developed countries can reform the 
international intellectual property system.  Id.  Instead of calling for a complete overhaul or 
the abandonment of the TRIPS Agreement, the article takes the position that the Agreement 
is here to stay and explores, from that standpoint, how less-developed countries can take 
advantage of the Agreement and reform the international intellectual property system.  Id. 
 24. The Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round stated that, “[i]n order to reduce 
the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights and to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and 
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines.”  WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on 
the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 September 1986), Part I Negotiations on Trade in 
Goods, available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.ministerial.declaration.uruguay.round.1986/d.html.  See 
generally ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 121 (stating that TRIPS does not obviate the need for 
a national system of intellectual property protection for non-industrial countries); 
CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  
THE NEW ENCLOSURES? 78 (2000) (“To assert the trade-relatedness of intellectual property is 
to make a claim for it to be legitimately included within the legal structure governing world 
trade.”); ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
67-92 (1990) (surveying available literature related to the impact of intellectual property 
protection on innovation, research, development, technology, and economic growth). 
 25. See MAY, supra note 24, at 74 (noting that TRIPS “disputes are mediated at the 
WTO through the agency of inter-governmental diplomacy.”); DAVID W. PLANT, 
RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (1999) (discussing the 
resolution of disputes arising from intellectual property in the international context).  See 
generally GALLAGHER, supra note 21, at 182 (“Members are permitted to limit the scope of 
rights within certain bounds, including to grant compulsory licenses under certain 
conditions, and to take measures to prevent abusive anti-competitive practices.”).  WTO 
members that do not comply with these trademark standards may be subjected to economic 
and trade sanctions imposed by other WTO member states or to expulsion from that 
organization.  Id.  TRIPS allow for settling disputes between member states over IP issues 
by applying the WTO “Dispute Settlement Mechanism.”  Id.  This mechanism also covers 
disputes pertaining to “National Treatment” as well as issues of “Most Favored Nation” 
status.  Id.  Other issues such as Gray Market (parallel imports) have been left out of TRIPS 
and the “Dispute Settlement Mechanism.”  Id. 
 26. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 475 (1997).  See also, International Trademark 
Association, TRIPS 2000 Subcommittee Treaty Analysis Committee, Developing Countries 
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement (Updated Version) (Oct. 1999), 
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_trips2000.pdf (discussing how TRIPS provides rules 
concerning trade-related intellectual property rights). 
KHOURYFINALIZED_TWO 3/31/2010  2:02:20 AM 
2010] TRADEMARK REGIME FOR “NEWCOMER” STATES 361 
 
without questioning the scope of its benefits and possible pitfalls.  Drahos 
concludes that developing countries have comparably little influence in the 
international intellectual property standard setting process.27  The diversion 
of intellectual property issues in the GATT-WTO forum and consequent 
creation of TRIPS was a product of forum shifting.28  In view of the current 
structure of international trade, developing countries appear to have 
resigned themselves to the fact that they have no real choice but to join the 
WTO because, in the long-run, no country can survive economically 
outside the WTO.29  In addition to the multilateral track, unilateral 
pressures have been brought to bear on developing countries.  The most 
prevalent of these is Special 301 of the US Trade Act which authorizes the 
United States Trade Representative to determine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of intellectual property rights in other countries.30 
2.2 The Impact of the Conventional Trademark Régime 
Given the low Trademark Potential of developing countries, this 
system, perhaps inadvertently, helps preserve the unrivaled exposure and 
 
 27. PETER DRAHOS, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARD-SETTING, 
www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp8_drahos_study.pdf, at 2 (“The main 
reason lies in the continued use of webs of coercion by the US and EU, both of which 
remain united on the need for strong global standards of intellectual property protection.”). 
 28. Id.  
 29. See ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 4 (outlining Dependency theory as an explanation 
for relations between developing and developed countries); K. C. Fung et al., Developing 
Countries and the World Trade Organization:  A Foreign Influence Approach 26 (J. Int’l 
Trade & Econ. Dev., BBVA Working Paper No. 0912, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468111 (“[P]owerful countr[ies] will always have an incentive to 
exert pressure on the poor . . . , but the developing countries will be better off with the WTO 
since its nondiscrimination principles help to mitigate and temper some of these 
influences.”); Ehsan Masood, Why the Poorest Countries Need a WTO, OPEN DEMOCRACY, 
Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-
trade_economy_justice/wto_3116.jsp (arguing that “a determined poor country stands a 
better chance of getting its way in the WTO than it does through other UN agreements”). 
 30. Trade Act of 1974, 301-06 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. 2411-16), amended 
by Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, 93 Stat. 295 (1979), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-573, 304-306, 
98 Stat. 3002 (1984), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1301—02 (1988).  See Judith H. 
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 301”:  Its Requirements, Implementations, and 
Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 260-61 (1989-90) (discussing Special 301's aim to 
promote the adequate and effective prosecution of intellectual property rights in foreign 
countries); Kevin M. McDonald, The Unilateral Undermining of Conventional International 
Trade Law via Section 301, 7 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 395, 408-10 (1998) (arguing that 
Special 301 violates international law as established under the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism).  See generally ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 7 (finding that the US has, through 
TRIPS, imposed its economic interests on various countries and regions including 
developing countries, and has subjected non-compliant countries to unilateral measures by 
the U.S., forcing the hand of developing countries). 
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distribution of marks originating in developed countries.  CTR is a 
problematic system because it does nothing to help developing economies 
compete in the global marketplace.  CTR thus contributes to preserving the 
already vast economic rift between “North” and “South.”  According to 
Dependency theorists, this enhances the argument against the blind 
importation of “Western” laws that are held to be “universal.”31  Dealing 
with the issue of trademarks in a sterile manner while overlooking the 
economic reality of the countries involved will only provide conclusions 
based on half-truths.  This view, regarding the effects of the law on 
different market players, is not limited to trademarks; it has preoccupied 
research in other fields of intellectual property, particularly patents.  For 
example, one study has demonstrated that the terms under which 
downstream firms can access intellectual property affects entry decisions, 
product diversity, prices, and welfare.32  The concept of harmonization in 
trademarks, as in other fields, cannot ensure fair global redistribution of 
resources.  Research dealing with international taxation has demonstrated 
that the concept of harmonization, even when it exists, is not synonymous 
with a “just” redistribution on a global scale.33  Consequently, the 
 
 31. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 8-9.  See generally Leaffer, supra note 19, at 3-4 
(“[T]rademark law has undergone profound changes, both multilaterally and regionally 
[examples being the Madrid Protocol, the Trademark Law Treaty and the Community 
Trademark].  These changes, brought about by increasing globalization of markets, are 
leading toward the acceptance of universal trademark norms and . . . we may even see the 
eventual unification of trademark law among nations.”); ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 21 (1978) (noting that “laws should as closely as possible express 
standards of conduct necessary for resolving current and foreseeable problems in society.  
The inference is that a proper identification of the real and possible problems within non-ICs 
must be the basis for introduction of relevant laws and mechanisms to help resolve those 
problems”). 
 32. Patrick Rey & David Salant, Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual 
Property, (June 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302368. 
 33. Tsilly Dagan, Just Harmonization (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.law.ubc.ca/files/pdf/ncbl/papers/Dagan.pdf.  This skeptic approach 
to the perceived benefits of harmonized systems such as that of the WTO has emerged in 
other contexts.  Id.  Dagan has demonstrated that in the context of international taxation 
“[h]armonization in itself is not necessarily a solution for a just global redistribution of 
wealth.”  Id. at 43.  Furthermore Dagan has alluded to the fact that “[a]lthough negotiations 
might be perceived as serving the interests of all the parties involved, they can, in fact, result 
in troubling outcomes.  Id. at 28.  Negotiations seem like a neutral procedure, since 
countries are free to choose whether or not to participate.  Id.  But in actuality, the shift from 
competition to negotiations is not a trivial move; replacing tax competition with negotiations 
entails costs for some of the parties and benefits for others.”  Id.  As such, Dagan is not 
optimistic about the redistributive attributes of harmonization.  Id.  She argues that, “[u]nder 
this scenario, harmonization would protect residence countries from tax competition among 
themselves but would drive taxation in host countries to the bottom, in preventing them 
from collecting taxes from foreign investors.  Id. at 21.  Thus, developed countries can be 
best understood here as operating as a cartel of capital suppliers—and transferring the costs 
of harmonization to developing countries.”  Id. 
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perplexing ease with which non-industrialized countries adopt the “latest” 
intellectual property laws and standards has been harshly criticized as “out 
of touch with the existing problems in the countries concerned.”34  As noted 
above, the only explanation for the adoption of the CTR by developing 
countries is the pressure that has been brought to bear on them by 
developed countries. 
SECTION THREE:  EXTREME REACTIONS TO THE MODERN TRADEMARK 
RÉGIME 
Conceptually speaking, trademarks are not a limited public good.  
There are an infinite number of possible distinctive trademarks.35  As such, 
on its face, it should not matter under what trademark a given market 
player operates because his competitors are entitled to operate under any 
other marks that they respectively devise.  Furthermore, trademark 
ownership is just a commercially-oriented proxy mechanism for (foreign or 
local) ownership of goods and services traded in a given country.  
Therefore, it should not matter whether ownership of the mark is local or 
foreign.  In addition, trademark laws afford equal protection to marks 
without regard to their proprietors’ origin, i.e., domestic or foreign.  This 
concept of equality is embedded in the CTR and is articulated by two 
principles, namely National Treatment (“NT”) and Most Favored Nation 
(“MFN”).36  When combined, these two principles ensure that member-
states treat domestic and foreign entities in the same manner.  In the 
context of trademark regulation, it means that local or foreign mark owners 
can qualify for equal trademark protection as afforded by national law.  
However, this legal equality and freedom to select marks should not, and 
cannot, function as a curtain which conceals the commercial realities on the 
ground.  As demonstrated by my earlier research, this prima facie equality 
on the legal-administrative level does not necessarily entail equality on the 
commercial-substantive level.  The findings in my previous research 
indicate that despite the equality on the formal level, brands emanating 
 
 34. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 7. 
 35. With the exception of shapes and colors. See Ann Bartow, The True Colors of 
Trademark Law:  Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti Competition Blues 97 KY. L.J. 263 
(2008) (arguing that the ability to trademark colors inhibits legitimate competition); Amir H. 
Khoury, Three Dimensional Objects as Marks:  Does a Dark Shadow Loom Over 
Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 335 (2008) (demonstrating that three 
dimensional objects can operate simultaneously as both a trademark and an industrial 
design). 
 36. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 
3, Jan. 1, 1995 (“Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property.”). 
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from developing countries have no real presence on the international 
trademark scene and do not even have an equal footing in their own 
markets.  Apart from the low Trademark Potential of developing countries, 
various foreign super-brands command a much higher value and impact on 
commercial activity.37  Therefore, despite the equal legal footing afforded 
to all market players, those from developing countries are at a disadvantage 
due to the low Trademark Potential of their domestic industry and the 
market strength that their brands enjoy. 
In the preceding section, I have established that the mere imitation of 
formalistic trademark protection legal structures that has been erected by 
developed countries does not necessarily improve the Trademark Balance 
of developing countries (given their low Trademark Potential).  On the 
contrary, it appears that these laws only serve to encourage the entry of 
additional foreign brands into the markets of developing countries.  This, in 
turn, would reduce the chances of market entry by newcomers.  It would 
also contribute to preserving the status of developing countries as merely 
import markets and allow foreign brands uncontested hegemony over local 
markets.  This would not only manifest itself on the fiscal commercial level 
but would also impact local culture.  Here, foreign marks have been 
infiltrating local culture and affecting moral values in society.38 
In light of these realities and adverse effects on newcomer states, and 
given their low Trademark Potential, it is quite possible to envision cases 
in which those states would search for specific solutions intended to 
neutralize the adverse effects on their status as competitors in the branding 
market.  This section is intended to examine possible far reaching and 
extreme solutions that are expected to entail unjustified costs. 
3.1 Maintaining the Status-quo 
The first possible reaction to this situation might be to maintain the 
status quo by reasoning that the CTR is part of a more expansive “trade-
off” which developing countries have accepted in order to enhance their 
 
 37. See generally Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, The Role of Trademarks in 
Developing Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN, New 
York, 1979, at 13 [hereinafter UNCTAD] (“[W]hile all registered trade marks have the 
same legal value and unlimited life, as long as they are renewed, their commercial value and 
duration are widely different.”). 
 38. See ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 6-7 (“The advocacy for, and support of, borrowing 
by non-ICs is done in disregard of considerations that may show certain IP forms as being 
more suitable for a certain country or time than for another country or for a different time. . . 
. Much of the borrowing or formulation of IP policies and laws in non-ICs has involved . . . 
very little or no understanding of the dynamic that operates in the economic and 
technological domain of the non-ICs.”). 
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ability to engage in international trade and commerce.39  However, given 
the conclusions in my previous research, it is highly doubtful that this 
reasoning is sufficient to justify CTR status quo.  Given the inherently low 
Trademark Potential of countries, one cannot simply adopt the CTR and 
then hope for the best.  Proactive action needs to be taken in order to align 
the CTR with the needs and interests of developing countries. 
My view rests on the premise that trademarks do not constitute an end 
in themselves, but rather a means towards regulating commerce.  As such, 
the validity of a given trademark system always needs to be contingent on 
its commercial benefits.  Indeed, in view of the Trademark Potential 
concept, the impact of the CTR on any given country depends on that 
country’s economy.  Therefore, if the CTR is creating a hurdle to market 
entry, it needs to be changed. 
It is worth noting that the CTR and its main component, i.e., TRIPS, 
reflect but one variant of how intellectual property is regulated around the 
world.  For example, while the European Union (“EU”) model requires 
member-states to adhere to a full harmonization of intellectual property 
policy, the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) sets higher 
standards than those prescribed by TRIPS and without requiring 
harmonization.40  Mercosur,41 as well as bilateral agreements between the 
EU and various non-EU members, allow for policy variances.42  An 
additional model that is applied by the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (“APEC”) is based on mutual exhortation to proceed as 
is appropriate to each nation, without formal negotiations on IPRs.  This 
allows each state to formulate an intellectual property régime that balances 
the moral justifications of intellectual property protection and its national 
interests.43  Such a model may be useful in circumventing the national 
 
 39. See Carlos M. Correa, The Strengthening of IPRs in Developing Countries and 
Complimentary Legislation, 2 (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/AboutDFID/files/itd/ip
rcl.pdf (stating that developing countries have accepted the CTR despite the fact that it often 
places them in an unfavorable position). 
 40. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 5 (comparing EU model and NAFTA model 
requirements for member states). 
 41. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercosur (defining the Mercosur as a 
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay created 
in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción and later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of 
Ouro Preto with the purpose to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, 
and currency).  See also Edgardo Rotman, A Guide to Mercosur Legal Research:  Sources 
and Documents, GLOBALEX (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Mercosur.htm 
(discussing the “Mercosur,” a Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay to 
set up a common market and eliminate trade barriers). 
 42. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that some agreements merely provide 
base requirements which states may then exceed). 
 43. Id. 
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treatment principle, especially where a country’s economic interests dictate 
this.  What is more, research has identified various trends that have been 
intended to allow countries to circumvent “intellectual property 
harmonization” in order to “reclaim autonomy over their intellectual 
property policies.”44 
3.2 Radical Interventions 
Given the misgivings of the CTR, there is a need to consider options 
for change.  One option for altering the CTR involves radical steps that 
diverge from the existing régime. 
3.2.1 Abolishing the Conventional Trademark Régime 
The low Trademark Potential and the Trademark Deficit of 
developing countries constitute a microcosm of the underdevelopment of 
these “periphery” countries.  Therefore, when considering how to react to 
the CTR, it is helpful to consider existing models for combating 
underdevelopment in non-industrialized countries.45  In this regard 
dependency theorists entertain the idea of “detaching,” “delinking,” or 
“decoupling” the economies of non-industrialized countries from those of 
industrialized countries.46  In the context of trademarks, this most radical 
approach of delinking calls for abolishing trademarks altogether because 
brands are merely an embodiment of capitalism in the age of globalization.  
In this regard the claim would be that if the CTR cannot remedy the 
Trademark Deficit because of the inherently low Trademark Potential of 
developing countries, then there is no sense in applying the CTR in those 
 
 44. Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property 
Regime, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 73 (2007).  Yu identifies five disharmonizing trends that offer 
resistance to the recent push for greater harmonization in the international intellectual 
property arena:  (1) the inclusion of reciprocity provisions in national laws; (2) the demands 
for diversification; (3) the use of bilateral and plurilateral agreements; (4) the creation of 
non-national systems as a response to Internet disputes; and (5) the reliance on alternative 
measures by rights holders.  Id. 
 45. ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 4.  In this context, the dependency theory has 
entertained a variety of models that may be applicable when considering underdevelopment 
in non-industrial countries, including socialism.  Id.  The rationale for such a far-reaching 
approach is, according to one commentator, that “dependent bourgeoisie . . . has been 
unable to undertake national development and may in fact impede it.”  Id.  Hence, there is a 
necessity to bring economic control back into the hands of the masses.  Id. 
 46. See id. at 8 (suggesting that non-ICs should “reject international IP rights and enter 
into bilateral arrangements if they need to. . . . [And n]on-ICs which have already 
introduced IP [laws] modeled after those in ICs and have become members of international 
conventions will have to rethink their actions and withdraw from them.”). 
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countries. 
One variant of this approach, namely the “No Logo” approach, 
submits that brands have overrun our lives because we live in a world in 
which everything has been branded, including taste, cultural standards, and 
even values.47  According to this approach brands have lost their 
justification because they have done away with their original function of 
indicating origin and assuring the quality of the product and have become 
the object of sale.  According to that position, successful brands know no 
limits; brands have not only moved from denoting a product to denoting a 
lifestyle, their owners have now set their sights on seducing the consumer 
into believing that he or she can live life inside their respective brand.48  In 
effect, trademarks, in their purely indicative capacity, have become a thing 
of the past.  Trademarks have shed their original skin and become a tool for 
market dominance and social change.  But the adverse effects of brands do 
not end in the commercial sphere.  They extend into the cultural sphere as 
well.  In fact, research indicates that the CTR has been exploited in order to 
leverage certain cultural views.49  Foreign brands do not only harness 
market control in the commercial sense but they also act as a Trojan horse 
whose purpose is to inject new cultural values into a given society.  In 
effect, some brands that are protected by the CTR embody a whole set of 
Western and mostly American values, which might not fit other cultures.50  
 
 47. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO:  TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES xviii (2000) 
(suggesting that university students, as well as social and environmental activists are upset 
by what they feel is an overarching corporate presence). 
 48. As such, producers now focus on their brands’ deep inner meanings.  Id. at 197.  
Namely, how the brand “capture[s] the spirit of individuality, athleticism, wilderness or 
community.”  Id.  Klein focuses on the NIKE mega brand.  Id. at 21-22.  She contends that, 
Nike’s swoosh logo has come to represent the ultimate in athletic style and whose slogan 
“just do it” identified it with the assertion of individuality.  Id.  She perceives brand builders 
to be the “new primary producers in our so-called knowledge economy.”  Id. at 198.   It is 
they who formulate what is of “true value:  the idea, the life style, the attitude.”  Id. at 198.  
See also Walden Bello, No Logo:  A Brilliant but Flawed Portrait of Contemporary 
Capitalism – A review of No Logo by Naomi Klein, Sept. 30, 2001, 
http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalism/nologo.htm (reviewing Klein’s work). 
 49. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534-35 
(1987) (holding that the word “Olympic” is trademarked and cannot be used to describe an 
amateur athletic competition).  See generally ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:  AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 226, 226-29 (1998) 
(explaining that those who own trademarks can influence cultural norms); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values:  How to Stop Worrying 
and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY:  A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 279-81 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis eds., 
2007) (arguing that trademark holders have been able to control certain aspects of our lives). 
 50. See Teresa Da Silva Lopes & Mark Christopher Casson, Entrepreneurship and the 
Development of Global Brands 81 BUS. HIST. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (arguing that some of 
the most successful companies have done cross-country analysis before marketing their 
brand); Smita Sharma, Onslaught of Global Brands - Indian Brands Fight Back!! 1 (2005), 
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Generally, these brands also carry a collective message, which is one of 
consumerism, a distinctively Western “value.”  In fact, due to this 
interrelation between brands and culture, some have referred to 
globalization as “Americanization,” “McDonaldization,” or “Cocalization” 
of the world.51  Furthermore, the mere fact that many of the leading brands 
are now owned by multinational corporations or holding companies that are 
registered in offshore locations, does not change the fact that those brands 
remain foreign and still dominate the local markets of many developing 
countries.52  In this context it is still possible to identify a core institution 
for each brand despite the multinational nature of the brand owning entity 
and the reliance on “outsourcing” models of production.53 
Consequently, in view of the iron grip with which leading brands 
dominate the markets, and in view of the fact that such brands have 
transcended their original function of indicating origin, it is not surprising 
that the idea of abolishing trademarks has appeared as a plausible solution. 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704266 (suggesting that Indian brands can survive in 
India despite competition with global brands if they offer something the global brands do 
not); John Tomlinson, Cultural Globalization:  Placing and Displacing the West, 8 EUR. J. 
DEV. 22-36 (1996) (examining cultural globalization as an extension of Western cultural 
power). 
 51. See Al-Tom, Abed-Allah Othman & Adam, Abed Al-Ra-oof Mohammad, 
Globalization:  An Analytical and Critical Study 98, 103 (Dar Alwarrak, London 1999) 
(noting that globalization and Western brand proliferation appears to fit logically within the 
perceived Western economic domination, noting Gandhi’s philosophy that opposed 
consumption of foreign products, contending that consumption contributed to continued 
British control of India, and, in addition, referring to a statement by Lord Cromer (the 
British High Commissioner of Egypt during 1883-1907) who boasted of his success (within 
only 15 years) in turning Egyptian textile workshops in Cairo into coffee shops—this after 
hampering the competitiveness of the Egyptian textile industry (which had been in stiff 
competition with the Lancashire textile companies of England)).  Clearly, proponents of 
globalization reject the notion that globalization is an extension of imperialism.  Id.  
According to those while imperialism achieved control by force, globalization does not.  Id.  
Accordingly, globalization is essentially a pacifist approach that does not employ the 
methods of “cultural imperialism.”  Id.  That approach also contends that the “cultural 
dimension” emanating from consumer brands is in fact a perception created by the 
consumers (in other non-Western cultures) and is not forced on those consumers by the 
“Western” brand owners and producers. Producers (in the West) are not preoccupied with 
“creating” new cultures but rather with increasing sales.  Id.  As such, globalization today 
should not be identified with Western imperialism, since some aspects of globalization 
(such as inventions and the environment) are in the interest of all countries and peoples.  Id.  
See, e.g., Tomlinson supra note 50, at 22-36 (1996) (concluding that globalization may not 
be completely within the grip of the West). 
 52. See Ricardo G. Flores &, Ruth V. Aguilera, Globalization and Location Choice:  
An Analysis of US Multinational Firms in 1980 and 2000, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1187, 
1189 (2007) (discussing the dominance of foreign brands). 
 53. See Kenneth M. Amaeshi, Onyeka K. Osuji & Paul Nnodim, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands:  A Boundaryless Responsibility? 
Clarifications, Exceptions and Implications 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 223, 224-25 (2008) 
(providing details on the structure of the brand ownership and production chains). 
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It is worth mentioning that the concept of abolishing the use of trademarks 
is not new.  Indeed, the idea was raised in the early 1970s, in the context of 
pharmaceutical products with the aim of reducing the price of drugs.54  This 
approach of “de-linking” in the context of trademarks would involve taking 
radical steps including the refusal to register foreign marks.  It would also 
include severely restricting their registration, refusing to base local 
applications on foreign registrations, cancelling procedures for priority 
applications, and nullifying (or limiting) all legal defenses or rights based 
on foreign marks, as well as well-known foreign marks.  I submit that such 
a radical approach should be rejected because it entails many losses that 
render it morally, legally, socially, and economically unjustified.  But most 
importantly, the lack of protection for this intellectual property subject 
matter is likely to discourage foreign investments that fuel economic 
development, create new jobs (domestically), and attract technology.55  
Indeed, the cost analysis of the “de-linking” approach will entail adverse 
consequences.  First and foremost, by abolishing trademarks the regulatory 
system would undermine the moral justification for rewarding efforts that 
are directed towards creating the goodwill (reputation) for brands. This 
would further diminish the benefits of trademarks, namely, indicating 
 
 54. See Robert Niblack, TRADEMARKS WHY? 5-8 (1976) (“Benefits to be gained by 
generic prescribing in contrast to prescribing by trademarks have been grossly overstated.”).  
Niblack defines a generic name of a product as the common non-proprietary descriptive 
name of a chemical or other entity and can be used by anyone.  Id. at 9.  In the case of a 
pharmaceutical product, it refers to an active ingredient in that product and is a shorthand 
version (adopted by a committee on names) of the chemical name which defines the 
complete molecular structure of that active ingredient.  Id.  Niblack reasons:  (1) that 
trademarks are a useful tool for identifying the source or origin of goods, and as such, both 
producer and consumer benefit from their use; (2) commonly, it is more practical to 
introduce a pharmaceutical product under a trademark than under its chemical or generic 
name; (3) as an indication of quality, a trademark prompts the producer to maintain the 
quality of his product, and if one trademark falls below the producers' usual standards 
(quality, value, and service), it may bring down with it his entire reputation and goodwill; 
therefore, the producer will typically not introduce his trademarked pharmaceutical product 
before sufficient medical research is conducted; (4) trademarks do not increase the price of 
pharmaceutical products, and hence, using a chemical or generic name rather than 
trademarks is not justified; (5) a product sold under the generic name “merely identifies its 
active ingredient(s) and gives no indication whatsoever of other features of the product, for 
example quality, formulation, dosage forms, biovalidity or, of course, source;” and (6) the 
price of a medicine is determined by constant costs, regardless of whether it is a generic or 
trademarked product.  Id.  According to Niblack these constant costs include the innovation 
level of the product; the product’s cost of development, production and introduction costs, 
the market structure or competing products, capacity, number, nature and price of 
competitive products, etc.; and the general conduct of the manufacturing firm (costs and 
sophistication or research programs, overhead expenses, anticipated earnings, etc.)  Id. 
 55. See Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in 2 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 70-73 (Adrian Sterling ed., 1997) 
(discussing the economical benefits of trademarks). 
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origin and preventing forgery.  Furthermore, the complete delinking from 
TRIPS by developing countries would effectively undermine the entire 
structure of that agreement.  Consequently, any country that embarks on 
this road should also expect to lose its membership in the WTO without 
which the prospects for foreign trade would be greatly reduced.56  Such 
“rogue states” should expect to incur severe trade losses, and to see a 
reduction in the scope of their exports.57  Furthermore, in the absence of a 
trademark régime, additional costs are anticipated.  They are highlighted at 
the end of this section. 
3.2.2 Restricting Entry of Dominant Foreign Brands 
Another radical step that might be undertaken by developing countries 
in response to the CTR would be to bar or limit the entry of certain foreign 
brands that dominate commercial activity in their respective fields.  In such 
a case, the argument would be that some foreign brands have attained such 
a degree of renown and influence to the extent that local industry is unable 
to compete against them.  Supporters of this approach might contend that 
the concept of prohibiting the entry of foreign products has already been 
utilized by the United States through Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 
1930, as amended, which allows a U.S. petitioner to bar the entry into the 
U.S. of foreign products that infringe a U.S. patent or any other patent 
right.58  The rationale behind Section 337 is that countries are entitled to 
invoke measures in order to limit the entry of certain infringing brands.  As 
such, Section 337 is considered to fall within the powers granted to 
member-states, by TRIPS, to exercise border measures that enhance the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and place restrictions on 
infringing products entering the country.59  By similar measure, it might be 
possible to tolerate certain protectionist steps that are intended to curb 
foreign trademark dominance.  Facially, the analogy seems to be out of 
place because, while Section 337 is intended to protect marks, my proposed 
 
 56. Indeed, even vast economies such as China have been keen to join the WTO. 
 57. One interesting, albeit theoretical, scenario is that of a synchronized mass de-
linking by all underdeveloped countries.  Such a “collective” walkout by the “consuming” 
countries may yield a reopening for negotiations of the entire world trade structure. 
 58. David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in 
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 107 (1995) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) 
(1988)).  In view of this harsh remedy, it is not surprising “that most Section 337 actions are 
settled either through the issuance by the U.S. International Trade Commission of a ‘cease 
and desist’ order or through a settlement that contemplates the conclusion of a royalty-
payment licensing agreement between the U.S. patent holder and the foreign producer who 
is allegedly infringing the [IPR].”  Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (1988); 19 C.F.R. 
§210.51(b)-(c) (1994)). 
 59. Gantz, supra note 58, at 108 (referring to the provision of the TRIPS agreement that 
pertains to special requirements relating to border measures). 
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measures appear to do the opposite.  However, once these protectionist 
measures are considered from a different perspective, the analogy appears 
to make more sense.  Indeed, in both cases the State intervenes in order to 
protect its national commercial interests.  That is to say, the State perceives 
itself as a relevant actor vis-à-vis commercial activity that has adverse 
spillover effects on its national market. 
However, even if the analogy does hold water, I predict that it will not 
be sustainable primarily because it undermines the legal equality between 
brand owners, without which, international trademark protection would be 
nullified.  In addition, it creates a spiral-down effect which can effectively 
lead to the abolishment of all forms of multilateral trademark regulation 
and a return to pure “nationalistic” regulation which does not fit into the 
reality of global trade.60  Such a trend would most likely lead to a slippery 
slope argument that would pave the way for additional unilateral State 
action against the entire WTO-GATT framework, including the re-
imposition of duties and tariffs on foreign imports and the granting of 
subsidies to national manufacturers. 
3.2.3 Raising the Level of the Test of Likelihood of Confusion 
Trademark infringements are generally determined using the test of 
likelihood of confusion.61  Hence, by raising the bar in this test, local 
trademark owners would be able to compete more easily with foreign 
marks without being considered as infringing on those marks.  In other 
words, domestic brand owners would be less at risk of being held liable for 
trademark infringement of other marks.  For example, local courts might 
provide less protection to colors, shapes or certain words by raising the 
level of the phonetic or visual similarities that are required in order to make 
a determination of trademark infringement.62  However, such a far-reaching 
rule is likely to encourage the use of confusingly similar marks rather than 
to increase the flexibility within the CTR.  That is why such a rule, if 
 
 60. Riccardo Faini, Trade Liberalization in a Globalizing World (2004) (Centre for 
Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 4665, October 2004) available at 
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4665. 
 61. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761-62 
(2004) (explaining that under the “likelihood of confusion” test, infringement will be found 
if the marks are deemed sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected). 
 62. Bartow, supra note 35, at 263.  Bartow cautions that “[t]rademark law can be used 
to monopolistically harness the aesthetic appeal or preexisting social meaning of a color.”  
Id.  In her view, the Supreme Court in Qualitex v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
161 (1995) “was wrong to facilitate this abuse of trademark powers” by ruling “that colors 
alone could constitute protectable trademarks.”  Id.  In her view this ruling “reduced 
competition and consumer choice by creating illegitimate aesthetic and communicative 
cartels.”  Id. at 264. 
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adopted, must be implemented with care because it carries a risk whereby 
confusion would prevail and consumers would be misled into purchasing 
products that they do not desire.  Another option, which is less problematic, 
might assume the form of a narrower application of specific doctrines, such 
as that of the initial interest confusion and post-sale confusion.63 
3.2.4 Restricting Franchising 
It might be possible to curb the economic impact that is associated 
with franchising by imposing various restrictions on franchising activities.64  
That is especially needed in view of the fact that franchising activity by 
foreigners seems to overlook local particularities.65  In the context of this 
research, developing countries might elect to raise the level of supervision 
that is required of brand owners.  This might cause a rise in the cost of 
these transactions and render them altogether less lucrative.  In addition, 
developing countries may choose to limit the share of profits that 
franchisees are entitled to collect.  While all of these restrictions can 
achieve the goal of discouraging the entry of foreign brand owners into a 
developing country, they also constitute a blatant and disproportionate 
intervention in the freedom of contract between franchisers and 
franchisees.  Still this intervention could be upheld due to the unbalanced 
bargaining positions of both parties.  A more radical step would be to 
restrict franchising altogether.  This would be applicable to cases in which 
 
 63. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 107 (2005).  While “[t]he benchmark of 
trademark infringement in the United States traditionally has been a demonstration that 
consumers are likely to be confused by the use of a similar or identical trademark to identify 
the goods or services of another . . . a court-created doctrine called ‘initial interest 
confusion’ . . . allow[s] findings of trademark infringement solely on the basis that a 
consumer might initially be ‘interested,’ ‘attracted,’ or ‘distracted’ by a competitor's, or 
even a non-competitor's, product or service.”  Id. at 107-8 (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted).  Initial interest confusion is being used with increasing frequency, especially in the 
context of the Internet, and “application of the . . . doctrine prevents comparative 
advertisements, limits information available to consumers, and shuts down speech critical of 
trademark holders and their products and services.”  Id. at 108.  See also Ben Allgrove & 
Peter O'Byrne, Post-Sale Confusion, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 315, 315 (2007) 
(exploring the implications of the initial interest doctrine after the sale of an infringing good 
or service under UK law). 
 64. Rahul Chakraborty, Franchising Laws in India-The Road Ahead 7-9 (Jan. 31, 2009) 
(working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335868 (suggesting a well 
developed legal structure on franchising is necessary for the effective functioning of 
business). 
 65. See Francine Lafontaine & Joanne E. Oxley, International Franchising Practices in 
Mexico:  Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts? 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 95, 
95 (2004) (exploring and comparing contractual restrictions in franchising agreements in the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico). 
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foreign franchises are found to severely disrupt market competition due to 
the market power associated with the foreign brand involved in the 
transaction.  In this regard, the rationales of antitrust theory could come 
into play.66 
3.3 The Ramifications of Radical Intervention 
The radical approaches that have been detailed above entail many 
costs that render them unwarranted.  This subsection details some of the 
most prevalent costs that can result from invoking extreme measures, as 
described above. 
3.3.1 A Surge in Counterfeiting 
A weak intellectual property régime is expected to lead to a surge in 
counterfeiting.  Even now, counterfeiting constitutes a global phenomenon 
that is intertwined with globalization.67  Indeed, just as it has become easier 
to engage in international trade, it has also become easier to trade in 
counterfeit goods.68  Counterfeiting is widespread in many types of 
commodities.69  In the absence of a trademark régime, counterfeiting is 
expected to increase exponentially.  That is because abolishing the CTR 
would create a regulatory vacuum in which counterfeiting could thrive.  It 
is worth noting that this problem, even with the existing CTR, poses a 
serious threat to producers around the world.70  Indeed, according to one 
 
 66. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere 28 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1091, 1091 (2002) (noting an unnatural monopoly has been created for trademark 
owners by the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy). 
 67. Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 1, 1 (2000); David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The Criminalization of Trademark 
Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998). 
 68. One commentary observes that “[a]s global trade has become easier, so the global 
trade in counterfeit goods has become easier.  The two go hand in hand”.  See Stuart Adams, 
Tackling Counterfeiters in the Middle East, 129 TRADEMARK WORLD 11, 11 (2000); Chow, 
supra note 67, at 1. 
 69. Including motion pictures (on tape), laser discs, DVDs, computer software (on CD-
ROM, CD-R and floppy diskettes), music (on CDs or tapes), toys, toys, handbags, wallets, 
backpacks, consumer electronics, sunglasses, and footwear.  See Puay Tang, The Social & 
Economic Effects of Counterfeiting:  A Scoping Study, IP Institute (2001) (detailing seizures 
in FY 2000 by the US Customs Services).  See also Goldstone & Toren, supra note 67, at 1 
(explaining that criminal punishment is appropriate for trafficking in counterfeit goods or 
services because it helps promote a country’s economic health and protect consumers). 
 70. Clothing, footwear, and luxury goods are more easily copied because of advanced 
technology that is at the disposal of counterfeiters.  Peter Fowler, The Scope and Global 
impact of Trade in Counterfeit Goods, http://www.aseansec.org/21385-8.pdf.  It is estimated 
that one in every 5 items of apparel and footwear sold worldwide are in fact forgeries with 
an estimated value of US$ 21 billion for the year 1995.  Id.  From the outset, it is important 
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study, international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods could have 
accounted for up to USD 200 billion in 2005.  That study further suggests 
that counterfeit and pirated goods in international trade grew steadily over 
the period 2000-2007 and could amount to up to USD 250 billion in 2007.71 
3.3.2 Loss of Foreign Direct Investment 
Another cost that is associated with the lack of intellectual property 
protection (including for marks) relates to the disincentive to foreign 
investors who own intellectual property.  These intellectual property 
owners will refrain from investing in countries that fail to protect their 
intellectual property rights.72  Thus, the loss incurred is twofold:  loss of the 
Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) and loss of technology transfers that 
usually accompany such investments.73  According to this argument, 
without such transfer of investments and expertise, developing countries 
will continue to “lack . . . advance[s] in health and housing conditions, 
skills and training, business practices, etc.”74 
 
to recognize the difficulties associated with estimating the volume of trademark 
infringements because of the nature of counterfeiting and the difficulty of measuring the 
volume of sales of pirated products.  Id.  That is because such products are sold on the black 
market and, by definition, are not coupled with bookkeeping.  Id.  Furthermore, it should be 
recognized that there is no complete overlap between purchasers who are willing to 
purchase original products and purchasers who are willing to purchase counterfeit products.  
Id.  This is because in the former group there are those who will buy only original products; 
and in the latter group there are those who cannot afford original products (or who do not 
mind buying fakes).  Id.  Therefore, a sale of fake products does not necessarily entail a lost 
sale in the other group.  Id. 
 71. OECD, MAGNITUDE OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS:  AN 
UPDATE (Nov. 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/44088872.pdf. 
 72. However, this premise is not accepted by all.  See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, at v (Centre for Int’l Econ. 
Stud., Policy Discussion Paper No. 0022, May 2000), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=231122 (“[S]trong IPRs alone are not sufficient incentives for firms 
to invest in a country.  If they were, recent FDI flows to developing economies would have 
gone mainly to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.  In contrast, China, Brazil, and 
other high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak protection would not 
have attracted nearly as much FDI.”). 
 73. FDI occurs in various forms including start-ups of new operations, purchase of 
(10% or more) of investment companies, and purchase of stocks and bonds (internationally).  
JAMES GERBER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 397 (4th ed. 2008).  In the past 3 decades, the 
volume of international FDI has risen sharply, from only US$ 105 billion in 1967 to US$ 
596 billion in 1984 and to a staggering US$ 3.2 trillion in 1998.  Id.  In 1996, FDI in the US 
totaled US$ 630 billion, up from a meager US$ 6.9 billion in 1970.  Id.  At the same time 
(1996), US direct investment abroad totaled US$ 796 billion.  Id.  Gerber limits the 
definition of FDI to physical assets (real estate, factories and business establishment, etc.).  
Id.  He contends at 397, that FDI’s have become a “major avenue for foreign market entry 
and expansion.”  Id. 
 74. Tang, supra note 69, at 60.  See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL 
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Notwithstanding, some commentators remain rather skeptical of this 
argument and contend that trade involving “transfer of technology” to 
developing countries is limited to “turnkey projects” and does not entail 
real technology transfers.75  Additionally, there is no clear correlation 
between lack of intellectual property protection and the withdrawal of FDI.  
A clear example of this is China, which despite its problems with 
counterfeiting and intellectual property enforcement, continues to enjoy an 
influx of FDI.76  What is more, this argument pertaining to loss of 
technology investments may be relevant in the case of patents but is much 
less so in the case of trademarks.  That is because branded goods are 
usually imported into developing countries as ready-made products while 
the manufacturing skills and the technology associated with these products 
remain outside the borders of developing countries.77 
3.3.3 Adverse Affects on Innovation and Creativity in Society 
A widely accepted argument asserts that a lack of protection for 
intellectual property rights will discourage innovation and creativity.  
Indeed, if a brand owner cannot protect his brand from unauthorized 
copying then he will have no real incentive to maintain the quality of 
products sold under his brand.78  Consequently, lack of such protection may 
 
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Mitchel B. 
Wallerstein et al. eds., National Academy Press, 1993) (noting the underlying policy 
tensions and trends in intellectual property rights development worldwide); Carlos A. Primo 
Braga, Carsten Finks & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development, 2000 World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412 (discussing the difficulties that 
developing countries face as a result of worldwide changes in intellectual property rights 
1993). 
 75. Saad Nusrullah, Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Rights 17 (July, 
2005) (Submitted to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for Summer School 
on Intellectual Property) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/5364069/Developing-
Countries-and-Intellectual-Property-Rights-by-Saad-2005 (“After [sic] second Patent Act, 
Thailand experienced an increase in technology transfer and FDI.  However, most ventures 
to date have been ‘turnkey’ projects, where technology is imported and controlled by 
foreign experts for a limited purpose.  So, this has failed to foster growth in domestic 
technology R&D and Thailand remains dependent on technology from industrialized 
nations.”). 
 76. Chow, supra note 67, at 1.  See also Tang, supra note 69, at 13 (noting that many 
Western multinational corporations have established assembly plants and factories in 
China). 
 77. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights:  Evidence from Transition Economies, 48 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 39, 39 (2004) (“[W]eak protection deters foreign investors in technology-
intensive sectors that rely heavily on intellectual property rights.  Moreover, the results 
indicate that a weak intellectual property regime encourages investors to undertake projects 
focusing on distribution rather than local production.”). 
 78. See Goldstone & Toren, supra note 67, at 18 (“To the extent that counterfeited 
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ultimately curb innovation and creativity in countries that do not combat 
piracy.79 
This position, however, seems to overlook the fact that the process of 
learning and development is sometimes contingent on copying.80  
Interestingly, even the United States, in its economic infancy, did not 
adequately protect foreigners' intellectual property rights under the pretense 
of boosting local innovation and knowledge through copying.81  Thus, the 
argument for preserving the inventiveness and creativity of intellectual 
property owners should take into account the identity of the brand owner 
and the country in question.  Indeed, the question should be:  Does the 
protection of trademarks in developing countries contribute to the 
innovation and creativity in those countries despite their Trademark Deficit 
and low Trademark Potential?  In view of my findings, it is not possible to 
conclude that the CTR is a positive factor in promoting innovation and 
creativity in developing countries.  However, one cannot rule out any 
adverse effects on innovation and creativity in society.  One such social 
cost might relate to the reduced incentive to maintain the quality of brands. 
3.3.4 Losses of Tax Revenues 
An additional social cost resulting from counterfeiting relates to lost 
tax earnings.  Those losses lead to the diversion of national revenues (from 
loss of tax revenues) away from public services because counterfeit 
products are generally sold through “clandestine channels” in which sales 
are neither reported nor taxed.  Consequently, anti-piracy advocates submit 
that “if there were no revenue losses incurred from counterfeiting, the 
revenue collected would have gone to pay for more health and education 
 
goods are permitted to be traded without sanction, incentives to invest in a reputation for 
quality work will be undermined.”). 
 79. PUAY TANG, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEITING:  A SCOPING 
STUDY, 57-58 (2001). 
 80. See Bruno S. Frey, Art Fakes--What Fakes?, An Economic View (Inst. for Empirical 
Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 14, 1999) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=203210 (concluding that “copies are not necessarily bad but rather 
good” because they “create[] utility for persons demanding, and paying for them.”). 
 81. This counter-argument draws strength from an unlikely historical source, namely 
the United States’ non-compliance with British copyright law:  “The US did not comply 
with British copyright law until 1891, neither was compensating scholars, part of the 
American political agenda then.”  Tang, supra note 69, at 57.  Accord Dru Brenner-Beck, 
Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84, 87-88 (1992) (stating that the 
United States did not recognize the works of foreign authors until 1891 and as a nation was 
one of the foremost pirates of British works); DORON BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS:  
INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 86 (2004) 
(arguing that “respect for Britain’s intellectual property laws was out of the question” in 
early colonial America). 
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services.”82 
This argument presupposes one crucial element; namely, that the 
revenues from the sale of original products or the rendering of services are 
taxed by the same country in which such products are sold or such services 
are rendered.  My findings indicate that developing countries mostly export 
commodities with low Trademark Potential, while importing products with 
high Trademark Potential.83  As such, the bulk of trademarked goods (and 
services) being sold in developing countries are foreign-owned.  
Consequently, the only taxable revenues collected by developing countries 
are those pertaining to the final sale involving the end consumer minus the 
cost of production and transit.  Those point of sale revenues constitute only 
a fraction of the revenues collected by the foreign brand owner.84  It is also 
worth noting that in a post GATT-WTO world in which import tariffs and 
customs duties have been greatly reduced, importing countries cannot 
offset the losses in sales through customs duties and other tariffs.85  Indeed, 
the argument relating to lost tax earnings is most relevant when considering 
counterfeiting within brand owning industrialized countries such as the 
United States, Japan, and countries of Western Europe, where most of the 
brand owning entities originate.  But, even in these countries, tax havens 
have reduced tax earnings. 
 
 82. Tang, supra note 69, at 58.  See also NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  AN OVERVIEW 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.nathaninc.com/NATHAN/files/CCPAGECONTENT/DOCFILENAME/000050
3252/Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Developing%20Countries.pdf (noting that 
counterfeiting “impede[s] economic development” as “[c]ash starved governments are 
deprived of tax revenues.”). 
 83. See MASKUS, supra note 13, at 81 (“Because the ownership and exports of 
intellectual property are concentrated in the hands of firms in a few developed countries, the 
effect of TRIPS will be to shift the terms of trade in their favor and away from intellectual 
property importer.  In turn, profits will be shifted from both developing countries and 
developed countries with a comparative disadvantage in intellectual property marketing 
toward a few developed economies, the United States in particular.”). 
 84. In practice, many foreign brand owners operate their own shops and outlets in 
developing countries (through licensing or franchising).  In such cases, even more revenues 
flow outwards into foreign countries in which said brand owners originate, thus reducing 
even more the extent of taxable income that flows into the treasury of developing countries.  
Consequently, the bulk of revenues from such transactions are not fully taxed by developing 
countries but rather by foreign states in which brand owners originate. 
 85. Elba Cristina Lima Rago, From GATT to WTO:  What Has Changed, How it Works 
and Where The Multilateral Trade System Is Going To, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9552.  See also Hideo Konishi et al., 
Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers 2 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=428346 (noting that “[a]ll countries would agree to immediate 
global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers 
from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have 
no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in the core of a 
Kemp-Wan-Grinols customs union game.”). 
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3.3.5 Loss of Employment Opportunities 
Another cost associated with counterfeiting is the loss of employment 
opportunities.  This is because the workforce that is producing authentic 
products is left partially redundant due to the decline in demand for 
authentic products.  Furthermore, foreign corporations that cannot secure 
their intellectual property in a given territory might be deterred from 
manufacturing in such countries (due to their fears of devaluing their 
products), thus causing an even greater loss of employment opportunities in 
that territory.86 
However, this argument cannot be applied in full vigor in the case of 
developing countries because the bulk of branded products that are sold in 
developing countries are produced oversees and imported as finished 
products.  Consequently, the bulk of the workforce that is connected with 
their production is not based in most developing countries.  Additionally, it 
is not clear whether Western-controlled production facilities, located in 
some developing countries, mostly in East Asia, do in fact benefit those 
countries given the low wages and the poor working conditions.87 
3.3.6 Jeopardizing the Consumers' Health and Safety 
Another social loss pertains to the health hazards that are associated 
with the consumption and use of counterfeit products such as foods, 
beverages, chemicals, electrical machines, tools, pharmaceutical products, 
clothing items (especially for infants), and even spare parts for cars and 
aircrafts.88 
 
 86. OECD, Leniency Programs to Fight Hard-Core Cartels, in 3 OECD J. 
COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y No. 2, 22 (2001).  See Tang, supra note 69, at 60 (noting that 
producers are “reluctant to manufacture their products in countries where counterfeiting is 
prevalent”); Braga et al., supra note 74, at 43 (discussing the difficulties that developing 
countries face as a result of worldwide changes in intellectual property rights); Edwin 
Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property:  Effects on Investment, Technology 
Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 112 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (reporting 
that a country’s intellectual property regime constitutes a major consideration amongst US 
firms evaluating that country’s suitability for direct investment). 
 87. See Richard M. Locke et al., Virtue Out of Necessity?: Compliance, Commitment 
and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains (MIT Sloan School 
Working Paper 4719-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286142; Bello, supra 
note 48 (stating that Klein argues Nike similarly exploited young workers by selling their 
products in the North, while denying their rights as workers through eliminating permanent 
employment, doing away with benefits, paying minimum wage, hiring part-time 
employment and severing the last non-instrumental tie by contracting workers from temp 
agencies). 
 88. Fake goods are more prone to contain components or ingredients of an inferior 
quality, thus making them less reliable and more prone to hurt the consumer.  Goldstone & 
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However, there is no empirical data that confirms a correlation 
between poisoning or injury incidents and the consumption of foods and 
beverages that are marketed under another producer’s mark or under a 
mark that is confusingly similar to it.  Similarly, no data proves widespread 
injuries from the use of counterfeit items of clothing or parts thereof.  In the 
case of counterfeit pharmaceutical products, the danger appears more 
plausible.89  The problem here does not lie solely with the producers, but 
also with consumers because their conduct suggests a readiness to assume 
the risk that is associated with the consumption or use of such products.  
Indeed, some research proposes the harsh question that if consumers do not 
perceive these potential dangers (or at least the less obvious and imminent 
ones) as a real cost, why should regulators step in to protect them?  Indeed, 
why not respect their wishes to purchase what they please, especially in 
cases that do not involve post-sale confusion by other parties?90 
 
Toren, supra note 67, at 8-9.  The danger in this case is mainly from clothing items bearing 
cheap and/or toxic fumes or from the possibility of detachable parts that may cause choking 
(buttons and other parts).  Id.  Trademarks and service marks play a vital role in modern 
society.  Id. at 8.  For consumers who cannot investigate the merits of every product they 
buy or service they use, marks can provide a uniquely reliable source of information about 
potential purchases.  Id.  For manufacturers, trademarks crystallize the good will they have 
built up over time and ensure that customers will continue to purchase their products.  Id.  
Counterfeiting can destroy these important benefits, cheating customers, manufacturers, 
legitimate retailers, and society at large.  Id.  In the most extreme cases, it poses a threat to 
public health and safety.  Id. at 9.  See also International Trademark Association, 
Counterfeiting, 
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1534&Itemid=&getco
ntent=4 (“Although some believe counterfeiting is a victimless crime, it has many far-
reaching consequences.  To begin with, depending upon the nature of the product being 
counterfeited, there can be serious health and safety concerns—as, for example, in the case 
of counterfeit baby formula, drugs, car parts, or electronic goods.  Needless to say, 
counterfeiting damages trademark owners’ goodwill in their products and detracts from their 
profits . . . .”). 
 89. See Amir H. Khoury, The “Public Health” of the Conventional International Patent 
Régime & The Ethics of “Ethicals:” Access to Patented Medicines, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 25, 25 (2008) (claiming that many residents in third world countries cannot afford 
to buy original products, the most striking example being medicines like the AID-HIV 
Cocktail). 
 90. See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (“Post-sale confusion occurs when use of a trademark leads individuals (other 
than the purchaser) mistakenly to believe that a product was manufactured by the 
trademark-holder.”).  CBC News In Depth, Counterfeit Goods:  Is Your Buy Real or Fake? 
And Why Should You Care?, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/consumers/counterfeit.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2007) 
(“[A] recent . . . poll found that two in five Canadians said they purchased counterfeit 
goods.”). 
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3.3.7 Encouraging Organized Crime 
The counterfeiting industry, much like other industries, requires 
organization as well as a well-oiled manufacturing and marketing 
infrastructure.  It is therefore not surprising that this industry is classified as 
a form of “organized crime”.91  However, in the context of developing 
countries, it is not at all clear that local society suffers from the fact that it 
buys fake consumer goods instead of original products owned by 
manufacturers originating in the United States, Japan, or Europe.  Indeed, 
as stated above, even European consumers are generally not bothered by 
the fact that such fake products are produced by crime syndicates in the Far 
East. 
3.3.8 Losses to Consumers 
When considering the losses to the consumer as a result of lack of 
trademark protection, there is a general tendency to refer to the 
“consumers” in a collective manner as if they were a coherent group of 
individuals with similar needs and expectations.92  However, this is not the 
case. 
One commentary distinguishes between two types of consumers that 
purchase counterfeit products based on the degree of their informed choice 
regarding that purchase.  One group within the general body of consumers 
willfully and knowingly engages in purchasing counterfeit products.  
According to one researcher, customers worldwide appear to be 
consciously choosing to purchase items that are not genuine and without 
regard for their inherent inferiority.93  A second group of consumers is 
unwittingly lured into such transactions. 
The common factor behind the actions of the two groups is their 
 
 91. See Tang, supra note 69, at 59 (“[Crime] [s]yndicates are the big operators of 
counterfeiting activity in the Philippines and Thailand.”); INTERNATIONAL 
ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT:  ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2005), available 
at http://www.iacc.org/resources/IACC_WhitePaper.pdf (explaining the links between 
counterfeiting, piracy and organized crime). 
 92. See OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, in 3 OECD J. 
COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y No. 2, 123 (2001) (explaining that “[f]rom a consumer 
perspective, intellectual property rights (IPRs) involve a tradeoff between short and long run 
gain.  In the short run, consumers would be better off if businesses were free to copy the 
results of one another’s creative efforts, thus helping ensure that products incorporating IPR 
are priced close to marginal cost.  In the long run, however, consumers would suffer if they 
had to forgo the fruits of activities IPRs are designed to encourage.”). 
 93. See Tang, supra note 69, at 58 (claiming that consumers are able to identify the 
authenticity of the product since “the price itself signals that they are counterfeit items”). 
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underlying motive to pay less.94  In this regard, one commentary 
acknowledges that consumers are constantly seeking to acquire well-known 
brands at cheaper prices.  Ironically, consumers may boast of buying 
(original looking) fakes for much less than the original products.  As such, 
counterfeiting should in large part be blamed on the consumers themselves 
because counterfeiters are merely “traders exploiting an opportunity.”95  
Here it may be possible to challenge the right to limit commercial activity 
that does not pose a threat of confusion.  However, this is beyond the limits 
of this research. 
An additional potential “consumer loss” emanates from the fact that 
while consumers might, in nominal sum, pay less for a product that is fake, 
they end up paying an “excessive price for an inferior product.”96  Indeed, 
when consumers elect to purchase cheap items of inferior quality, they 
might ultimately end up paying more by way of maintenance or even 
sustaining bodily harm. 
A third type of loss that might be suffered by consumers emanates 
from the possibility that brand owning entities would refrain from selling 
their products in some countries, thus, effectively reducing the scope of 
consumer choice in that country.97  However, no empirical research is 
provided in support of this contention.  Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a 
foreign brand-owning corporation would opt to commit commercial suicide 
by willfully electing not to sell their products in a given jurisdiction and 
thus intentionally reducing its revenues to zero.  It should be noted that 
such producers (brand owners) cannot even achieve short term success (as 
an educational exercise) because consumers (in that specific jurisdiction) 
would still be able to obtain authentic products through parallel imports.  
Furthermore, the local industry might even benefit because in the absence 
of dominant brands, domestic manufacturers would be able to expand their 
share in the market. 
In conclusion, when applied to developing countries, the cost analysis 
approach is somewhat less convincing given the low Trademark Potential 
therein.  However, adopting an approach that effectively abolishes 
trademarks would be resisted by both brand owners and developed 
countries.  Furthermore, that approach would undermine the moral basis of 
protection and would entail negative effects and costs that cannot be 
overlooked.  In my opinion, formulating the best reaction to CTR involves 
taking into consideration the varying levels of Trademark Potential and the 
Trademark Balance, the interests of local consumers and producers, and 
 
 94. See Adams, supra note 68, at 11 (stating that the opportunity to counterfeit is a 
byproduct of consumers desire for cheap prices on well-known brand products). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Tang, supra note 69, at 58. 
 97. Id. at 9. 
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the need to promote fair competition. 
SECTION FOUR:  THE MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH:  CREATING A 
NEOCONVENTIONAL TRADEMARK RÉGIME 
After rejecting both of the aforementioned extreme solutions, i.e., full 
adoption or full rejection, it appears that the only viable trademark régime 
is one that presents a middle ground approach that contributes towards 
reducing the Trademark Deficit of developing countries and raises their 
Trademark Potential while not completely deviating from the standards of 
the CTR.  Ideally, such a solution would contribute towards reversing the 
negative effects of the current trademark régime while preserving the moral 
basis of trademark protection and avoiding unnecessary political and 
commercial conflicts with industrialized brand-owning countries. 
This concept of a middle ground approach has been recognized as the 
only workable approach in the wider context of development of non-
industrialized countries (non-ICs).  In this context, one commentary 
submits that: 
“If, as seems inevitable, foreign interests are to be involved in 
economic activities, then the ways in which they blend with 
indigenous inputs becomes of great importance.  It would be 
imperative for non-ICs to pursue selective policies that promote 
and extend positive benefits but prevent harmful effects that 
foreign interests may entail.  This might be the only way of 
realizing policies arising from a correct assessment of the 
strength and weakness of the respective non-ICs in light of the 
international situation as a whole. . . . Neither complete insulation 
nor wide-open integration but a policy of enlightened 
discrimination would present the correct answer.”98 
Furthermore, in this context one pre-TRIPS commentary has observed 
that: 
“Intellectual property rights are independently defined and granted by 
all nations.  Thus, protection of these rights is territorial.  Each nation must 
choose the composition and extent of the protection it will provide and 
structure its laws to accomplish its political and economic objectives.  
Historically, this choice has reflected a country’s evaluation of the costs 
and benefits of a particular level of protection, and the effect on the 
country’s economic objectives.  The choice of an ideal level of protection, 
ranging from free access to intellectual property at one extreme to complete 
protection at the other, will change as the country develops and its 
 
 98. Paul Streeten, Development Dichotomies, 11 WORLD DEV. 875, 883 (1983).  See 
also ENDESHAW, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining the effects of the legal transportation of 
ICs’ laws into non-ICs’ laws). 
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economic needs change.  This change is largely due to the accompanying 
change in the calculation of costs and benefits at the different stages of 
development.”99 
In this section, I explore some amendments that may be entered into 
for the CTR in order to introduce changes from within the existing system 
while still preserving its continuity.  This reformulation of the CTR would 
create what I refer to as a NeoConventional Trademark Régime. 
4.1 Reinvigorating Comparative Advertising 
Comparative advertising is a powerful marketing tool, whereby one 
party may promote its brand by comparing its products (or services) with 
its rivals’ products.  This measure helps to draw the consumers’ attention to 
competing products of comparable quality, which are sold under other 
brands.  This legal tool already exists in various national laws.100  It can 
also be derived from a notion of free speech and act as a counterbalance to 
unlimited trademark rights.101 
According to one observer “[c]omparative advertising, when truthful 
and non-deceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and 
assists them in making rational purchase decisions.  It encourages product 
improvement and innovation and can lead to lower prices in the market 
place.”102  The use of comparative advertising is further justified because 
trademarks, especially in the modern era, have expanded their role beyond 
the basic, albeit important, function of indicating the source of products and 
have acquired an independent value of their own.  Furthermore, leading 
brands now command strong loyalty by consumers who are unaware of the 
qualities (or even the existence) of alternative products marketed under 
lesser known brands. 
Under conditions of “perfect competition” the products of different 
 
 99. Brenner–Beck, supra note 81, at 85 (internal citations omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., Manuel Morasch, Comparative Advertising—A Comparative Study of 
Trade-mark Laws and Competition Laws in Canada and the European Union (2004) (faculty 
of law dissertation, thesis, University of Toronto), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=685602 (discussing comparative advertising laws in the United 
States and Canada). 
 101. See, e.g., Filippo M. Cinotti, “Fair Use” of Comparative Advertising Under the 
1995 Federal Dilution Act, 37(1) IDEA 133 (1996) (exploring the implications of “fair use” 
and the First Amendment for comparative advertising); Samia M. Kirmani, Cross-Border 
Comparative Advertizing in the European Union, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 201 
(1996) (noting recent debate over the trade impacts of comparative advertising laws in 
European nations). 
 102. Cassels Brock, Apples to Oranges Comparative Advertising, May 22, 2004, 
http://www.hg.org/articles/article_396.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (citing Energizer v. 
Duracell (Australia), where the court rejected the notion that comparative advertising should 
be subjected to increased scrutiny). 
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sellers constitute perfect substitutes from the consumer’s point of view and 
demand is determined by the price of a given product or service.  In this 
market of “perfect competition,” business would compete through the price 
of the products sold.  However, in the modern market, products are not 
homogeneous.  In this market, buyers and sellers do not have full 
knowledge of market conditions and there are barriers to entry and exit.  
Furthermore, the consumer’s “imperfect” knowledge of the selection of 
products leads him or her to evaluate one brand over-optimistically while 
being excessively pessimistic about others.  Research concludes that these 
manifestations of “loyalty” are clearer among individual (household) 
consumers whom are prone to commit both types of errors because they 
purchase a limited amount of a wide range of products and because they 
cannot afford the assistance of trained experts.  Thus, their product 
selection is typically based on clues “many of which are not accurate 
indicators of [the] products’ value or quality.”103  It is the combination of 
these two errors that ultimately lead consumers to develop unsubstantiated 
“loyalty” to some brands over others.  Thus, the consumer’s “Brand 
Loyalty” affects or predetermines the consumer’s future choice.  
Comparative advertising is intended to offset this imbalance.104 
 
 103. Donald F. Cox, The Sorting Rule Model of the Consumer Product Evaluation 
Process, in RISK TAKING AND INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 324-68 
(Donald Cox ed., 1976); A.G. BEDIAN, CONSUMER PERCEPTION OF PRICE AS AN INDICATOR 
OF PRODUCT QUALITY, MSU Business Topics 59 (Summer 1971); A.G. Woodside, Relation 
of Price to Perception of Quality of New Products, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 116, 116 (1974); 
R.W. Olshavsky & T.A. Miller, Consumer Expectations, Product Performance and 
Perceived Product Quality, 9 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 19, 19 (1972).  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that “errors of commission could be made persistently over time, all based on 
nothing more than the mere existence of brands for experience goods.  This is generally 
called brand loyalty or trade mark allegiance.”  UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 7.  This report 
defines “experience goods” as those goods “whose utility can be evaluated only after their 
purchase (e.g. canned foods, drinks, soaps, motor-cars, appliances).”  Id.  Other goods 
whose quality and distinct features can be judged by a simple inspection are referred to as 
“search goods;” fresh fruits and vegetables are included in this latter group.  Id.  
Understandably, consumers are less prone to commit purchasing errors with respect to 
“selection goods” because they can independently and cheaply collect information about 
different products.  Ross M. Cunningham, Brand Loyalty--What, Where, How Much?, 34 
HARV. BUS. REV. 116, 116 (1956).  That study found that “a significant amount of brand 
loyalty to individual products does exist – more, indeed, than has hitherto been realized by 
many marketing executives”.  Id.  That study concludes that “[t]here are many instances 
where 90% or more of a family’s purchases have been concentrated on a single brand over 
three whole years.”  Id.  That empirical research encompassed several experience goods and 
found that this pattern of behavior runs across the entire socioeconomic spectrum of 
consumers.  Id. at 117. 
 104. The rationale underlying “Brand Loyalty” is that the market operates under 
conditions of imperfect competition.  UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 7.  As such the consumer 
has imperfect knowledge of the products that he desires and the availability of alternatives 
to such products.  Id.  Thus, the consumer can commit two types of errors, “commission” 
and “omission.”  Id.  The former occurs when the consumer makes a purchase based on “an 
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The modern market reflects a system of “imperfect competition” 
wherein similar products do not compete on an equal footing and non-price 
competition is prevalent.  Indeed, in the modern market where conditions 
of “imperfect competition” dominate the scene, producers are able to 
compete through “product differentiation” and competing products 
constitute only “close substitutes” of each other.105  Various factors (the 
trademark included) can contribute to establishing product 
differentiation.106  The economic structure of developing countries and their 
relatively limited diversification lead to a situation whereby a few foreign 
firms dominate its consumer market, resulting in oligopolies or even 
monopolies.  And as stated above, under these conditions of imperfect 
competition, producers are able to invoke various non-price measures (such 
as trademarks) that are able to influence the consumers’ choice and 
demand. 
In view of this “imperfect competition,” as well as product 
differentiation and brand loyalty, it is evident that trademarks do carry a 
substantial independent value that influences or even determines consumer 
demand.107  Therefore, despite the legal equality that is afforded to all 
trademarks, this does not entail equality in the impact of trademarks and 
their market foothold.  This state of affairs provides the justification to the 
(measured) use of comparative advertising. 
It is worth noting that the comparative advertising tool has been 
recognized in the laws of many countries.  Suffice it to mention, EU 
Directive 97/55/EC that has amended an earlier Directive (84/450/EEC), 
 
inflated or excessively favorable, pre-purchase assessment of the goods.”  Id.  This type of 
error could cause the consumer to get less than he bargained for.  Id.  The later type of error 
occurs when the consumer “demands less than he would if he had full knowledge” of all 
alternative products on the market.  Id. 
 105. See UNCTAD, supra note 37, at 6 (noting that “while in perfect competition the 
cross elasticity of demand between different pairs of outputs will approach infinity, such 
elasticity will be perceptible and finite in the case of competition through product 
differentiation.”). 
 106. See E.H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION:  A RE-
ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 56-62 (5th ed. 1947) (explaining that both 
trademarks and patents “make a product unique in certain respects; this is its monopolistic 
aspect.  Each leaves room for other commodities almost but not quite like it; this is its 
competitive aspect.”).  The differentiation achieved through trademarks exceeds that of 
patents and industrial designs because the protection that is granted to trademarks is not 
limited in time and trademarks are connected with the product (or service in the case of a 
service mark) and can visually be perceived by the consumer in a clear and direct manner.  
Id.  Despite this distinction, trademarks and patents possess similar monopolistic and 
competitive qualities.  Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Baila Caledonia, Assessing a Company’s Most Valuable Assets: 
Conducting an Intellectual Property Audit, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (June 4, 2001), 
available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=11872 (explaining the worth of 
intellectual property and the need to assess its true value). 
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deals with misleading advertising.  Furthermore, the national laws of 
European countries are now bound by these norms and provide conditional 
recognition of comparative advertising.  The most vivid example of this 
appears in German law, which recognizes comparative advertising within 
the boundaries of actions that are not misleading.108  Similarly, the 
International Trademark Association has called on all countries to “permit 
comparative advertising so long as there are legal controls to prevent harm 
and/or damage to the marks of competitors, and to prevent explicit or 
implicit false or misleading representations or other forms of unfair 
competition.”109  In line with this approach, if the comparative advertising 
mechanism is abused, then the brand owner can invoke legal recourse in 
the form of both monetary damages and “corrective advertising” at the 
expense of the infringer.110 
I submit that the use of the comparative advertising tool should be 
further enhanced so as to make it a central feature in existing commercial 
brands.  This type of comparative advertising is especially needed in 
developing countries in view of the marketing power that is enjoyed by 
foreign brands, and in order to enable local brands to compete in the 
market.  Consequently, where comparative advertising is conducted within 
the boundaries of truth and objectivity, it should be allowed and even 
encouraged.  This legal tool is especially justified in view of the imperfect 
market conditions and brand loyalty that strong brands command as well as 
the low Trademark Potential of countries.  Comparative advertising should 
be pursued vigorously and become standard procedure in the marketing 
operations of newcomer states.  In this regard, the legal maneuvering space 
should be expanded.  This can be achieved by way of amending the CTR 
and ultimately trademark laws on the national level.  For example, the law 
should provide a clear defense involving the bona fide use of another’s 
mark, so long as it is informative and truthful.  Furthermore, the judiciary 
may also contribute to the successful use of comparative advertising by 
taking a more lenient stance towards prospective infringers.  Herein lies a 
 
 108. See Andrea Lensing-Kramer & Peter Ruess, Recent Developments in Comparative 
Advertising and the Implications for Trademark Law in Germany, 94 TMR 1315, 1332-34 
(2004) (explaining Germany’s movement away from strict prohibition of using a 
competitor’s trademark in advertising, to allowing it so long as the advertisement is not 
misleading); Ulf Doepner & Frank-Erich Hufnagel, German Courts Implement the EU 
Directive 97/55/EC--A Fundamental Shift in the Law on Comparative Advertising?, 88 
TRADEMARK REP. 537, 537 (1998) (describing how the German courts have implemented 
the new rule). 
 109. INTA, Comparative Advertising, March 3, 1998, 
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=217&Itemid=153&get
content=3. 
 110. See Paul E. Pompeo, To Tell the Truth:  Comparative Advertising and Lanham Act 
Section 43(a), 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 565, 577-80 (1987) (describing court-imposed penalties 
for abuse of comparative advertising). 
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quandary regarding the optimal scope of this tool.  On the one hand, there 
is the view that comparative advertising should be tolerated as long as it 
does not present the consumer public with factually misleading 
information.  A more reserved view would be that comparative advertising 
should not be used in order to undermine trademark rights or to reduce the 
incentive of trademark owners to maintain quality.  While the first 
approach is one that recognizes the need to use trademarks in creative ways 
(e.g., stepping on two competitors canned beverages to get the third brand 
of beverages), the latter approach is more concerned with the ramifications 
of such use on overall competition in the market and on the dilution or 
tarnishment of the marks.  This latter view would most likely caution 
against the opportunistic use of another's trademark.  Indeed, the latter 
approach would tolerate comparative advertising so far as it provides 
consumers with access to information.  The latter approach would be 
inclined to view unrestricted comparative advertising as an abuse of 
trademark rights under the pretence of market entry. 
Given the two sides of the argument, my view is that the use of 
comparative advertising should be restrained lest it becomes a tool for 
circumventing the laws of unfair competition.  My advocacy for the 
proactive use of comparative advertising as a tool for assisting newcomer 
states does not overlook the public interest of preserving competition.  It is 
merely an attempt to reinvigorate competition within the bounds of open 
and accessible information.  Therefore, in order for the comparative 
advertising tool to be effective, there needs to be a clear commitment 
within the national trademark system towards ensuring commercially-
oriented free speech.  In my view, reservations about the Freedom of 
Commercial Expressions Doctrine do not derogate from the need to allow 
the free flow of relevant information to consumers, even at the cost of 
limiting the scope of trademark rights.111  In other words, the legal culture 
within the relevant national jurisdiction needs to be such that market 
players can utilize this tool without fear or hesitation, so long as it does not 
produce misleading information.112  Absent such immunity it would not be 
possible to facilitate the unimpeded circulation of information and the 
comparative advertising tool would remain redundant. 
In addition to all of the above, it is worth noting that while, in theory, 
this legal tool can be used by newcomers and non-newcomers alike, its 
 
 111. See ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION xxiv (2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=545142 (dismantling the 
arguments put forth by supporters of the commercial expression doctrine). 
 112. See Francesca Barigozzi & Martin Peitz, Comparative Advertising and Competition 
Policy 33-34 (Int’l Univ. in Germany, Working Paper No. 19, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=699583 (discussing how both legal practice and consumer 
perception affect whether comparative advertising firms will make false or truthful 
statements). 
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projected use will predominantly be by the former group.  That is because 
while newcomers will be keen to inform and educate consumers about their 
products that are similar in quality to existing products (that are sold under 
dominant brands), the owners of established brands will not have an 
interest in “promoting” a competitor's lesser-known brand.  Indeed, the use 
of comparative advertising is merely a tool to foster market entry by lesser-
known brands covering products and services that are comparable in 
quality with products that are covered by leading brands.113  Clearly, such a 
policy will not be effective in cases where the consumer seeks to purchase 
goods because of the specific (foreign) brands that they are sold under.  In 
those cases the consumer would be making the selection not based on the 
quality-price axis, but rather, on the social-cosmopolitan image that the 
foreign brands denote.114  But if that is true, the role of the comparative 
advertising mechanism remains relevant for many consumers, especially 
for products that are purchased but not displayed by their owners.  This is 
especially true for car parts and home products. 
4.2 Tolerating “Association” Advertising 
In addition to the (classic) comparative advertising tool as described 
above, I propose taking comparative advertising to new heights.  This 
proposal involves the use of a new tool, which I refer to here as association 
advertising.  This tool would allow domestic brand owners to go a step 
further in comparative advertising and to actually use another’s brand on 
their respective products.  The aim of this use would be to indicate to the 
consumer the characteristics of products marketed under other lesser-
known brands.  In other words, the aim would be to create, in the minds of 
consumers, a direct “association” between rival brands, namely that of the 
dominant market player and that of the newcomer.  Such a method could be 
used, for example, to indicate the “compatibility” of products, especially in 
the case of spare parts, i.e., that a certain product is compatible with other 
 
 113. See Smita Sharma, Onslaught of Global Brands--Indian Brands Fight Back!!!, 1 
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704266 (“Brands can [] survive by delivering a 
value advantage over the new brands”); see also Charles A. Rarick, Mecca-Cola:  A Protest 
Brand Makes its Mark, 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122863 (discussing 
how companies such as Mecca-Cola, a Coca-Cola substitute, has been successful in 
countries with large Muslim populations); Nebahat Tokatli, Asymmetrical Power Relations 
and Upgrading Among Suppliers of Global Clothing Brands:  Hugo Boss in Turkey, 7 J. 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 67, 69-70 (2007) (citing Hugo Boss as an example of a small firm that 
encroached a market that was already dominated by leading brands). 
 114. See Geoffrey Jones, Blonde and Blue-Eyed? Globalizing Beauty, c.1945-c.1980, 61 
ECON. HIST. REV. 125, 150 (2008) (highlighting that beauty ideals vary from country to 
country and that consumers select their cosmetics based on whether the company matches 
their beauty ideal). 
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competitors’ products.  This is particularly useful in cases involving the use 
of spare parts for machines or refills for relevant products.115  This method 
is quite similar to the love/like slogans that are used in advertising.116  This 
form of association advertising would allow for actual informative use of 
another’s brand on one’s own product in order to highlight its substitutive 
value.  Another, more radical form of association advertising would 
sanction the use, by newcomers, of another's mark in order to indicate the 
“generic” qualities of their own product.  This can be referred to as 
“Substitute” association advertising.  Clearly, this more radical form of 
association advertising should be restricted to cases where the party 
requesting its use is able to establish that its competitor’s brand dominates 
that market to an extent that renders any (regular) competition futile.  In 
other words, it should be applied only in cases involving sectors that are 
dominated by specific brands effectively creating a form of “Brand 
Antitrust.”  As such, this solution can only provide partial and limited relief 
to brand owners originating in developing countries.  Its use would be 
contingent on the commercial status of established brands.  This, in turn, 
would ensure that use of those brands does not become a method for free 
riding or for creating confusion among consumers in relation to brands of 
similar market strength. 
The justification for my proposed association advertising emanates 
from various sources.  The initial justification rests on utilitarian theory.  
Indeed, if the aim of the intellectual property system is to promote social 
benefits, then the regulator should be inclined to adopt any system that 
enhances competition and maximizes social benefits.  This would include 
cases where consumers are afforded maximum information with minimum 
search costs.  Other research along these lines have called for removing 
government restrictions on advertising expression (as copyright protected 
content) and on slogans (as trademarks) in order to enhance market 
competition by increasing the “images and language available for use in 
advertising.”117  The second tier for justifying association advertising rests 
on the already existing trend of greater leniency when it comes to the 
interface between trademark law and the need to promote market 
competition.  This has become increasingly prevalent in the virtual sphere.  
There it has been argued that trademark triggered pop-up ads or search 
result ads should be tolerated if they are properly indentified and not 
 
 115. See Gillette v. Amir Shivook (citing the example of razors as compatible with 
Gillette shavers); Kenwood case (Israel) (discussing spare parts for Kenwood mixers). 
 116. See Diane M. Reed, Use of "Love/Like" Slogans in Advertising:  Is the Trademark 
Owner Protected? 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 102 (1989) (discussing how advertisements 
that mention a competitors’ name in its slogan have become popular; for example, “If You 
Like [Their Product], You’ll Love [Our Product]”). 
 117. Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 189, 263 (2006). 
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misleading.118  This approach has been further bolstered by the notion that 
trademarks can be used as keywords by internet search engines because the 
Internet is analogous to an “information mall” that should be made 
accessible to all; information should flow freely without being restricted by 
intellectual property rights.119  A third tier of justification for association 
advertising rests on the fact that consumers’ choice is in many cases 
superficial because it is not as a result of a clear deductive process, but is 
influenced and shaped by psychological, as well as, irrational factors.120 
4.3 Limiting the Scope of Protection of Well-Known Marks 
The overly broad coverage of well-known marks has been a topic for 
concern in research literature.  The concern has focused on the scope of 
protection that the law should grant to well-known marks in order for them 
not to become overly dominant.  These marks not only control the market, 
but also create the “need” to purchase products or services that are covered 
by them.  Indeed, these leading marks raise the volume of imports and 
could, ultimately, increase the dependence of local consumers on foreign 
brands.  Consequently, some literature has been highly apprehensive about 
granting broad protection to well-known marks that are not registered in a 
given jurisdiction.121  This is not surprising given the imbalance in the 
terms of brand-holdings between the industrialized brand-owning countries 
and developing countries. 
 
 118. See Kendall Bodden, Pop Goes the Trademark? Competitive Advertizing on the 
Internet, 1 SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH. 12, 12 (2005) (discussing current case law and 
legislation that affects internet advertising, specifically trademark-triggered advertisements 
and “pop-up” ads). 
 119. See Matim Li v. Crazy Line (District Court of Tel Aviv); See also Kurt M. 
Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner 
Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 574-75 (2002) (asserting that keyword banner 
advertisements should be treated as trademark fair use and should not lead to liability). 
 120. See Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: 
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 985 (2007) (noting that the 
courts have stretched the element of likelihood of confusion, in trademark cases to include 
irrational consumer decisions). 
 121. See Maxim Grinberg, The WIPO Joint Recommendation Protecting Well-Known 
Marks and the Forgotten Goodwill, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2005) (suggesting 
that the overbroad territorial protection proposed by the Joint Recommendation from the 
World Intellectual Property Organization dealing with protection of well-known trademarks 
undermines important policies of U.S. trademark law:  it allows the attainment of 
enforceable trademark rights without investment in the trademark's goodwill and diminishes 
the quantity of available trademarks to U.S. entrepreneurs, raising their cost of entry into the 
market); David Vaver, Unconventional and Well-Known Trade Marks, 8 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 18 (2005) (stating that expanded protection accorded to these marks is not self-
evidently a good thing in public policy terms and concluding that reforming the law is not 
the same as reforming it). 
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In light of this state of affairs, it might be necessary to reduce the level 
of protection that is afforded to well-known marks that have not been 
registered in a given developing country.  In this way, developing countries 
would limit the protection granted to well-known marks to only those 
marks that are registered in their respective jurisdictions.122  Developing 
countries would only implement article 16(3) of TRIPS with respect to 
well-known marks that are registered in the relevant jurisdiction.123  In 
other words, those countries would be exempted from implementing article 
6bis of the Paris Convention in relation to well-known marks that are not 
registered in the given jurisdiction.124  It is worth noting that such a step 
may be a setback for the owners of well-known marks which are not 
registered in the relevant jurisdiction.  However, such a setback, if it is 
indeed present, could very well be offset by the tort of passing-off.  That 
tort could provide sufficient protection for marks that enjoy renown but 
which are not formally registered with the national trademark office.125 
An additional method in which to further limit the clout of well-
known marks would be to lower the benchmark of generic marks, making it 
possible to classify well-known marks as generic names thus allowing them 
to be used by people other than their original owners.126  The aim of such 
an exercise would be to deflate the impact of leading foreign brands.  
Understandably, such a step is expected to encounter stiff resistance by 
industrialized, brand-owning countries.  Therefore, and in order to shore up 
support for such an undertaking, those countries would need to receive 
some form of compensation.  This compensation might be achieved by 
establishing a centralized international registration for well-known marks 
or by reducing the registration fees for marks that are deemed to be well-
known. 
 
 122. In that case, well known marks that are also registered in the relevant jurisdiction 
would be subject to the other restrictions that are detailed in this section. 
 123. In developed, industrialized countries, the full application of Article 6bis of The 
Paris Convention and Article 16 of TRIPS, is warranted because it is assumed that the 
industries in those countries have a real opportunity at competition. 
 124. The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio, if their legislation so permits, or at 
the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the 
use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to 
create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of 
registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person 
entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods.  These 
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of 
any such well–known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith. 
 125. See Ng Siew Kuan, Foreign Traders and the Law of Passing-Off:  The Requirement 
of Goodwill within the Jurisdiction, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 372, 373 (1991) (examining the 
common law tort of passing-off). 
 126. See Dev Saif Gangjee, Say Cheese!  A Sharper Image of Generic Use Through the 
Lens of Feta, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 172, 172 (2007) (discussing the legal and political debate 
on whether Feta cheese should be deemed a generic term). 
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4.4 Reducing the Impact of Leading Foreign Brands 
One way to reduce the influence of foreign brands on local consumers 
might be to impose pricing restrictions on products sold under leading 
foreign brands so that the owners of such brands do not abuse the 
persuasive value that their brands enjoy.  By keeping the prices of leading 
products at bay, developing countries could better ensure that their 
domestic consumers do not end up paying an excessive price for products 
that they feel compelled to buy.  However, such conduct is contrary to the 
principles of open and free trade as prescribed by the WTO-GATT 
framework.  Such conduct can be considered an unwarranted intervention 
in trade.  However, because consumers are operating in a market of 
imperfect competition, they should be protected from being trapped in their 
own “brand loyalty.”  This is of special relevance in the case of products or 
services that have aspiring local substitutes that are put on the market under 
lesser-known brands.127  A counter argument might suggest that there is no 
need to intervene to lower the price of leading brands because the rule of 
supply and demand will offset any excessive pricing or disproportionate 
market control.  According to this approach, increasing rather than 
lowering prices of such goods would curb the power of leading brands.  
Regardless, price intervention remains a very problematic concept and is 
liable to create a slippery slope effect that could lead to the complete loss 
of market competition and to excessive governmental regulation of free 
markets. 
Furthermore, in order to counter the sway of foreign brands and the 
scope of exposure that they enjoy, it may be possible to limit the scope and 
intensity of their advertising activity by setting a quota for advertising of 
foreign brands.  This is intended to bridge the rift between the advertising 
capability of domestic and foreign brands and would allow the consumers 
to be proportionally more exposed to domestic brands that compete with 
foreign brands over the same consumer segment.  These controls can be 
achieved by applying antitrust rationales as will be detailed in Section 4.6 
below. 
A third way to possibly limit the hegemonic impact of leading foreign 
brands is by openly encouraging parallel imports of (gray market) goods.  
Conceptually speaking, the TRIPS agreement does not conclusively 
regulate parallel imports.  It does, however, grant member-states the 
freedom to determine the scope of those imports.  Therefore, developing 
countries can, if they choose, adopt a legal norm allowing for unrestricted 
 
 127. See Bharat N. Anand & Ron Shachar, Brands, Information, and Loyalty 22-23 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Competition & Strategy Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 00-
069, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240792 (arguing that consumers may 
become attached to particular brands because they lack information about substitutes). 
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parallel imports.  In this regard, developing countries can embrace the 
doctrine of International Exhaustion of trademark rights.128  Under that 
doctrine, a brand owner’s rights are exhausted after the first sale of the 
product bearing the mark, thus permitting the product to be imported into 
any other jurisdiction notwithstanding the right of sole use that attaches to 
trademarks.129  That being said, it is important to bear in mind that the 
impact of parallel imports on developing countries is limited in scope 
because of the fact that most parallel imports are directed to rich markets in 
which there is still a chance to generate profits from parallel imports that 
originate in poorer countries.130  Thus, in this context, the beneficial impact 
of parallel imports on developing countries is questionable.131  A fortiori, 
parallel imports would not directly contribute to raising the Trademark 
Potential or the Trademark Balance of developing countries.  However, by 
allowing various market actors to import the same branded goods, market 
competition would be enhanced and the price of these products would be 
reduced.  In my view, the latter two tools, i.e., parallel imports and the 
imposition of limitations on advertising, are more likely to take root than 
the first, more radical idea of intervening in the price of products. 
4.5 Promoting the Use and Registration of Domestic Trademarks 
In addition to the low Trademark Potential of developing countries 
and the control of markets in developing countries by multinational 
corporations, there is an acute need to promote national awareness about 
the power of trademarks.132  Indeed, in a world in which product promotion 
 
 128. This is the case in some countries including Australia, Japan, and Israel. 
 129. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, Parallel Imports and Price Controls 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12423, 2006), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=923346. 
 130. See Romana L. Autrey & Francesco Bova, Gray Markets and Multinational 
Transfer Pricing 2-4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-098, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351883 (creating a model to examine the effects of gray markets 
on relatively richer countries); see also Charles A. Rarick, First Black, Now Gray:  The 
Increasingly Difficult Task of International Brand Protection (2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112463 (discussing how counterfeit New Balance shoes made in a 
relatively poorer country, China, were then imported into a relatively richer country, Japan). 
 131. See generally Mattias Ganslandt & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights, 
Parallel Imports and Strategic Behavior 40 (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982241 (suggesting that restraints on parallel trade may actually 
lead to the distribution of essential medicines to poor countries); Keith E. Maskus & Chen 
Yongmin, Parallel Imports in a Model of Vertical Distribution:  Theory, Evidence and 
Policy, 7 PAC. ECON. REV. 319, 321 (2002) (discussing existing literature, which suggests 
that developing countries prefer not to restrict parallel trade). 
 132. See VIDA SANDOR, TRADEMARKS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 32 (Licensing 
Executive Soc’y Int’l ed., Akade’miai Kiado’, 1981) (noting that even when it is possible 
for developing countries to avail themselves of trademarks, they often fail to do so).  A 
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and marketing is no less important than production itself, the publicity of 
the brand has a decisive effect on consumer choice.  Thus, by promoting 
the concept of a national brand, I predict that producers in developing 
countries will be able to secure a larger portion of the domestic branding 
market. 
When doing this, producers should first determine the identity of their 
potential consumers and then create a brand that would be appealing to 
their tastes; one that they can identify with.  Ideally, producers in 
developing countries should invest in increasing their respective brands’ 
appeal through attractive packaging.  Even this seemingly “superficial” 
component is crucial in the contest for the hearts and minds of 
consumers.133 
Local producers should be encouraged to create new and elegant 
brands based on distinct features of local culture that might capture the 
consumers’ imagination.  In this regard, UNCTAD suggests that 
developing countries should use trademarks that indicate names of 
historical or famous personalities as well as names of internationally 
recognized locations within developing countries.  Potential trademarks 
could be:  Great Wall of China, Cleopatra, Petra, Sphinx, Jordan River, 
Sinai, Red Sea, Everest, Sahara, Victoria Falls, and Dead Sea.134  Such 
brands may even capture the imagination and attention of consumers in the 
West.  A living example along these lines is the Mecca-Cola brand 
covering a cola beverage, which has been competing with internationally 
renowned brands such as Coca Cola,135 Pepsi Cola, and RC Cola.  As could 
 
striking example of such a lack of awareness involves Oriental carpets, and the process 
European merchants’ initiated to regulate the use of indications of origin when identifying 
carpets.  Id.  In 1970, the Association of Oriental Carpet Traders in Switzerland reportedly 
published a list of trade names to be applied in carpet trade.  Id.  Thus, in Switzerland names 
like Tabris, Serabent, and Bochara are only used with respect to hand-made carpets, 
produced in those Iranian towns, and the mark Barber is applied to carpets made in North 
Africa.  Id.  As reflected in this case involving geographic indications and/or indications of 
origin, producers in developing countries are generally unaware of the marketing power of 
trademarks and indications of origin.  Id. at 33.  However, the opinion survey that I 
conducted reveals that brand owners are becoming more aware of the role of trademarks. 
 133. See BELINDA ISAAC, BRAND PROTECTION MATTERS 1-25, 136-191 (2000) 
(discussing the effect of various marketing and branding choices).  See also JOHN MURPHY 
& MICHAEL ROWE, HOW TO DESIGN TRADEMARKS AND LOGOS (1988) (examining the history 
of different logos and their purposes). 
 134. See SANDOR, supra note 132, at 35 (referring to UNCTAD). 
 135. DEXTER BROOKS, Global Approach to Building Strong Trademarks, in STRATEGIC 
ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND GLOBALIZATION ECONOMY 3, 5 
(Thomas Cottier, Peter Widmer & Katharina Schindler eds., 1999).  Dexter Brooks, a senior 
staff council, legal division, at the Coca-Cola Company, Atlanta, USA, notes that, “Coca-
Cola is the world’s best-known trade mark.  The company is the world's leading marketer of 
soft drink syrups and concentrates, with 1995 retail sales of $18 billion and a total sales 
volume double that of our nearest competitor. . . . Coca-Cola is available in more than 195 
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be expected, this religious connotation behind the Mecca-Cola brand has 
also generated consumer interest among Muslims around the world.136 
A helpful step towards raising the Trademark Potential of developing 
countries, it would be useful to initially focus on existing national products.  
Developing countries should invest in building and promoting domestic 
brands covering national agricultural products.  Such products might 
include grains, cereals, vegetables, fruits, and textiles.  Furthermore, local 
consumers should be alerted that in some cases foreign brands cover 
products of a similar quality to those covered by the local brands.  For 
example, in the case of the textile industry, consumers should be alerted to 
the simple truth that many of the leading Western brands have been 
engaged in outsourcing activities.137  Furthermore, many of the world-
famous (Western) coffee brand owners import their coffee from developing 
countries (mainly Colombia). 
Where commercially feasible, producers in developing countries 
should “Go-Global” with their brands after identifying possible potential 
markets for their products around the world.  Producers in developing 
countries should determine where to export their products and, by this, also 
determine where to register their trademarks in order to receive adequate 
protection for them.138 
Similarly, consumers should be alerted to the existence of national 
products, and they should be encouraged to appreciate their local products 
and to view them with a sense of national pride.  This way, consumers 
might also begin to manifest preference to national brands as a microcosm 
of national pride.  In addition, producers should maintain a high level of 
product quality and reliability so that the brands that they market under are 
able to establish long lasting goodwill among local and international 
consumers and to even raise the demand for such products. 
Another way to boost the trademark competitiveness of developing 
countries is to have those countries cooperate among themselves.  This can 
be done with a view to raising the quality and design of products, 
 
countries; and company brands account for more than 45 per cent of all soft drinks sold 
worldwide. . . . [W]e have in force at present 13,000 registrations throughout the world . . . 
.”  Id. 
 136. See Charles A. Rarick, Mecca-Cola:  A Protest Brand Makes its Mark (Purdue 
University Calumet, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122863 
(“Mecca-Cola and other products have arisen in recent years in response to an increasing 
anti-American and anti-globalization movement in certain parts of the world.  This case 
briefly explores this movement, with a focus on one company, Mecca-Cola, and asks 
readers to explore the consequences for American multinational brands.”). 
 137. For example, Levi’s Corporation has reportedly shut down its last two production 
factories in the U.S. and has relocated its production plants to the Far East. 
 138. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, 
Switz., Dec. 11-19, 1978, Report of the Ad hoc Group of Experts on the External Trade of 
the Least Developed Countries, 6 (March 19, 1979). 
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improving quality of labor, investing in research and development 
(“R&D”), and understanding international export markets. 
In the context of trademarks, this cooperation may be achieved by 
establishing “Regional Trademark Preferential Zones.”  The aim of such 
zones would be to promote regional trademarks and service marks, and to 
encourage their use.  In addition, such zones would ideally allow for fast 
track registration of national marks in other partner countries and would 
even allow for a common registration system.  In such a system, a valid 
trademark registration in one member-state would be considered a valid 
registration in other member-states.139  Furthermore, developing countries 
may elect to diversify their imports by shifting from Western industrialized 
countries to other developing countries.  In this way, the Trademark Deficit 
and the Trademark Balance of developing countries would be greatly 
improved.  This, in turn, may contribute to the consumers’ awareness of the 
existence of various brands for similar products, and consumers would be 
less inclined to focus on a limited number of leading brands.  Clearly, in 
order for all of these actions to succeed, it is necessary for the regulator to 
create an apt legal setting and to engage in legislative activity towards this 
end.  Furthermore, the governments of developing countries are required to 
launch national awareness campaigns that are intended to protect the use 
and registration of domestic marks. 
4.6 Raising Antitrust Protection in Developing Countries 
While developing countries have enhanced intellectual property 
protection in their jurisdictions, they have not passed sufficiently vibrant 
competition laws.  Developing countries generally lack sophisticated 
competition safeguards to counter-balance foreign intellectual property 
rights.  Indeed, while protection of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) is 
injected into the legal and administrative systems of developing countries, 
mainly through TRIPS, those countries generally lack a competition policy 
system that can “prevent and remedy possible abuses by IPRs right 
holders.”140  Maniatis, who makes this distinction, contends that, 
“consumers want choice and information, in the case of competitive 
markets, and regulation covering prices, quality, penalties and 
 
 139. In the context of this research, it would be possible to claim that in view of the 
findings, a “Trademark Union” or “Free Trade Market Area” could be a reasonable counter-
measure to the domination of the market by Western brands.  Here too, the deviation from 
the MFN principle (as prescribed by TRIPS) may arguably be a form of “affirmative action” 
or “corrective discrimination.” 
 140. CARLOS M. CORREA, U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., THE STRENGTHENING OF IPRS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COMPLIMENTARY LEGISLATION 2 (2000), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/AboutDFID/files/itd/ip
rcl.pdf. 
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compensation, in the case of markets where competition is absent.”141  This 
observation is especially true given that consumers in developed countries 
are better informed and are more exposed to their national brands, while, 
on the other hand, consumers in developing countries are exposed to 
foreign brands and the cultural values that they encompass without any 
noticeable domestic competition.  Thus, it might be possible to counter-
balance the power of foreign brands through antitrust legislation that would 
authorize the governments of developing countries to intervene in 
commercial activity that effectively creates brand monopolies.142  The need 
for a proactive antitrust system in developing countries is an acute one.  
This is especially because those countries are “particularly vulnerable to 
inappropriate intellectual property systems.”143 
Invoking such antitrust measures could be based on article 40(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement that is intended to mitigate the exploitation of market 
power.  That article includes a non-exhaustive list of potentially abusive 
licensing practices including exclusive grant-back conditions and coercive 
 
 141. Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in INTELL. 
PROP. AND MARKET FREEDOM 65, 119-20 (Persp. on Intell. Prop. vol. 2) (Adrian Sterling 
ed., Sweet & Maxwell Limited 1997).  See also Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 
48 EMORY L.J. 367, 478-80 (1999) (arguing that trademark protection necessarily leads to 
anticompetitive losses). 
 142. See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 402 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003) 
(“We conclude that antitrust doctrine is sufficiently supple, and sufficiently informed by 
economic theory, to cope effectively with the distinctive-seeming antitrust problems 
presented by the new economy–-the most striking example of the rise of intellectual 
property to the pinnacle of the American economic system.”); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The 
Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1979 
(Univerity of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-46, Nov. 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 (noting that true conflicts between antitrust and 
intellectual property are rare); Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual 
Property Law:  Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2003) (arguing that 
copyright and patent law can be effective vertical restraints); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, 
Rethinking U.S. Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights 5 (New York Law School Public 
Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, No. 22, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=719745 (describing the interplay between competition and policy 
rights as seen in both antitrust and patent examples). 
 143. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 4 (2003), 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf, (“[W]e consider 
that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP system ‘wrong’ in a developing country are 
likely to be far higher than in developed countries.  Most developed countries have 
sophisticated systems of competition regulation to ensure that abuses of any monopoly 
rights cannot unduly affect the public interest.  In the US and the EU, for example, these 
regimes are particularly strong and well-established.  In most developing countries this is far 
from being case.  This makes such countries particularly vulnerable to inappropriate 
intellectual property systems.”). 
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package licensing.144  It is understood to provide “considerable discretion to 
WTO member states in specifying ‘. . . licensing practices or conditions 
that may . . . constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights . . . .’”145  
Some commentators contend that this article could be interpreted in a broad 
manner so as to cover “abuse[s] of [intellectual property rights], including 
monopoly pricing, refusals to license, effectuating horizontal cartels 
through patent pooling, and exclusive vertical arrangements that forestall 
competition.”146  This broad interpretation, which seems warranted given 
the language and the rationale of article 40, should be sufficient to allow 
developing countries to protect their local market and industry from 
invasive or domineering foreign brands.  This is notwithstanding the 
specific protection that is provided by TRIPS to well-known marks.147  
Indeed, although it would not be easy to substantiate the assertion that 
article 40, broadly read, overrides such a specific provision that is plainly 
set out in TRIPS, it is possible to reconcile them by stating that each article 
addresses a specific issue.  While the first is intended to protect marks that 
enjoy world renown, the other is intended to curb abuse of the intellectual 
property system and to facilitate market entry and competition. 
4.7 Import Substitution 
Raising the Trademark Potential of developing countries might also 
be achieved through the diversification and expansion of domestic 
production into areas that possess a higher Trademark Potential.  In 
essence, the aim here is to motivate the national economy to produce its 
own national brands to effectively substitute foreign brands for local ones.  
But, as a matter of fact, on the macro level the concept of national self-
sufficiency is not new.  Various developing countries, such as Mexico, 
have experienced some success in their respective endeavors to establish a 
viable and stable system of import substitution.  However, that success has 
been short-lived due to external pressures that have been brought to bear by 
 
 144. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, at 337, 33 I.L.M. 1197, at 1213 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] 
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market.”). 
 145. The WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries’ in a Millenium 
Round, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 20-21, 1999, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property 
Rights in Developing Countries:  Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agreement, 
(prepared by Keith E. Maskus & Mohamed Lehouel) 18. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at 326 (incorporating Article 6bis of the 
Paris Convention). 
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industrialized countries citing concepts of free trade.148  In the first half of 
the twentieth century, various developing countries attempted to exit this 
vicious circle of “free trade” and to reduce their dependency on foreign 
products and service by establishing substitutive national industries.149  
This method is referred to as “Import Substitution” or “Import-Substituting 
Industrialization.”150  Import substitution rejects the underlying concepts of 
free trade and comparative advantage, which hold that specialization is 
equally beneficial to both developed and developing countries.  It also 
rejects the approach that underlies the GATT Agreement, wherein the 
expansion of international trade, to the benefit of all countries, is contingent 
on the removal and promotion of intervention in the free market.151  
Consequently, fundamental changes are warranted so that those developing 
countries may achieve acceptable rates of growth, otherwise import 
substitution would discontinue.152 
 
 148. See LESTER B. PEARSON ET AL., PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT:  REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Praeger Publishers 1969) 4-6 (noting that 
the idea of self sufficiency was also upheld by the Pearson Report of 1969 commissioned by 
the UN International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).  See also Christian 
Joerges, Free Trade with Hazardous Products?  The Emergence of Transnational 
Governance with Eroding State Government (Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper LAW No. 
2006/05, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908843 (discussing the weighing of 
domestic concerns with free trade). 
 149. Constantine Michalopoulos, Developing Countries' Participation in the World 
Trade Organization (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1906, 1998), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=620518; Magali Cowan & Melissa H. Birch, Trade 
Strategies for Development:  Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion (Darden Case 
No. UVA-G-0393), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419317. 
 150. See HOWARD HANDELMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 231 
(Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996) (describing the practice of import substituting industrialization as 
reducing dependency on foreign imports by producing them at home).  See also BEVERLY 
M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 34-35 (1998) (stating 
that in the middle of the past century (1940-1960), Mexico followed a policy of ‘import 
substitution’ during which Mexico experienced an average annual growth of 6.4 percent in 
its gross domestic production). 
 151. See NICOLAS LOCKHART & ANDREW D. MITCHELL, Regional Trade Agreements 
under GATT 1994:  An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 
WTO 217 (Andrew D. Mitchell ed., Cameron May 2005) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=747984 (examining regional trade 
agreement exceptions to GATT and their role in expanding trade); Gyoung-Gyu Choi, The 
Optimal International Trade Agreement and its Enforcement under Asymmetric Information 
3 (Sept. 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=46905 (noting that GATT was built 
upon the assumption of the rule of free trade); Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO 10 (John M. Olin Law and Economic 
Working Paper No. 228, Oct. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=604582 
(describing Cordell Hull’s principles of free trade as shown through the 1934 Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement). 
 152. See CARL, supra note 18, at 35-36 (referring to a study by Dr. Raul Prebisch (the 
executive president of UNCTAD), Towards a New Trade Policy for Development:  Report 
of the Secretary—General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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Import substitution has been achieved in some countries through a 
dual process of attracting investment (both foreign and domestic) and 
placing restrictions on imports.153  Despite initial expenditures on inputs for 
production, import substitution has allowed such countries to reduce the 
scope of imports and to create new job opportunities domestically.  Despite 
its initial promise, this economic model has been short lived.  Its collapse 
began as early as the 1960s due to a host of reasons.154  First, the market for 
consumer goods manufactured by these sheltered industries that practiced 
import substitution were small, thus preventing manufacturers from taking 
advantage of economies of scale.155  Second, the local industries in 
developing countries lacked access to modern technology and their 
production was slower, less efficient, and of a lesser quality.  Third, 
industrialized countries, spearheaded by the United States, viewed import 
substitution as a direct threat against the international expansion of their 
own industries on the world market and exerted pressure on developing 
countries to abandon this system.  This pressure was applied through 
various channels including the World Bank, the IMF, the GATT-WTO, and 
the Generalized System of Preferences.156 
 
(UNCTAD), UN Econ., UN Doc. E/Conf. 46/3 at 6, 11-19 (1964)), in which Dr. Prebisch 
added that GATT’s rules and principles are based on an “abstract notion of economic 
homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial concerns 
and peripheral countries with all their important implications.”). 
 153. See Marcelo De Paiva Abreu, Afonso S. Bevilaqua  & Demosthenes M. Pinho, 
Import Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890s-1970s 2 (Dec. 1996), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=45564 (describing the role of import substitution in Brazil’s coffee 
export growth); Anne O. Krueger & Baran Tuncer, Microeconomic Aspects of Productivity 
Growth under Import Substitution:  Turkey 4 (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper Series No. 532, Aug. 1980), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=263411 
(arguing that non-traditional industries are not more dynamic than traditional industries and 
therefore import substitution does not necessarily yield rapid long term growth). 
 154. See Diego Puga & Anthony J. Venables, Agglomeration and Economic 
Development:  Import Substitution Vs. Trade Liberalisation 2 (Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion Paper No. 377, Nov. 1997, rev., Nov. 1998), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=74696 (noting that import substitution attracts a different sector of 
industry than trade liberalization, which has consequences on the economic development of 
the country); Douglas A. Irwin, Did Import Substitution Promote Growth in the Late 
Nineteenth Century? 3 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 
8751, Feb. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=299163 (questioning whether import 
substitution promoted growth through shifting the employment from agriculture to 
industrial, or whether the shift in employment itself was the catalyst for growth). 
 155. See CARL, supra note 18, at 35-36 (stating that by the 1960’s import substitution 
was “exhausted” on the national level because the markets for the consumer goods of 
protected industries were small and this limited market size “prevented manufacturers from 
taking advantage of economies of scale.”). 
 156. See id. at 36-37 (noting that ultimately, these efforts bore fruit because the 
governments of developing countries “were persuaded that the road to economic prosperity 
and political stability was foreign trade”).  The sum of these factors led some developing 
countries, primarily East Asia’s newly industrialized countries (NICs), to shift their 
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Another approach recognizes the importance of trade to economic 
development and contends that developing countries should, rather than 
export primary products, initiate a process of industrialization through 
“backwards linkage, starting with light industry and concluding with 
capital goods production.”157  This approach is referred to as the 
“structuralist approach.”158  Thus, while neo-classical theorists claimed that 
the benefits of trading between two countries would be distributed equally, 
structuralists have asserted that the industrialized countries not only 
retained their own productivity gains, but also absorbed a portion of 
productivity generated from primary exports.159  Evidently, those that 
oppose the school of comparative advantage share a perception whereby 
“fostering state owned enterprises is essential both to protect national 
independence and to develop new industries.”160  In this regard, one 
commentator notes that “the only long term hope of developing countries is 
to replace imported goods by domestic products and to create conditions 
enabling their national economy to meet local demand without resorting to 
foreign resources.”161  As alluded to above, when a wider variety of 
products are domestically produced in a certain country, national brands 
 
emphasis “away from import substitution over to export expansion” also referred to as 
Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI).  Id.  Consequently, developing countries began to 
reduce their tariffs and to increase their imports of manufactured products with a high 
trademark potential thus increasing their trademark deficit.  Id.  The steps undertaken by 
developing countries with respect to their abandonment of import substitution were not 
reciprocated by developed countries. While sixty developing nations were working (during 
the late 1980s) on reducing their trade restrictions, twenty of the top twenty-four 
industrialized nations were raising their trade barriers.  Id.  This is further testimony to the 
structural bias in the global trading system.  Carl also explained that a number of developing 
countries, especially Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, dramatically reduced their tariffs and 
increased imports.  Id. at 36-37.  See also HANDELMAN, supra note 150, at 234 (explaining 
that “East Asia’s NICs initiated their industrialization drive through import substitution, just 
as their Latin American counterparts had done years earlier.  Soon, however, they 
diversified into manufacturing for export.  Early protectionism measures were phased out, 
thereby forcing local companies to become more competitive.  State agencies shaped the 
market, pressuring manufacturers and offering them incentives to export.  By 1980, 
manufactured goods constituted over 90 percent of all South Korean and Taiwanese exports, 
while representing only 15 percent in Mexico and 39 percent in Brazil. Fueled by their 
dynamic industrial export sectors, East Asia’s booming economies, have become the envy 
of the developing world.”) (citations omitted).  Interestingly, some research argues that the 
experience of East Asia’s NICs in Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) was a positive 
one.  Id. 
 157. CARL, supra note 18, at 36. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. (“The elasticity of demand were low for primary products, while the 
developed countries’ exports (especially manufacturers) enjoyed relatively high elasticities 
of demand.”). 
 160. Id. at 35-36, n.110. 
 161. SANDOR, supra note 132, at 24 (referring to conclusions reached by the Pearson 
Report, at 80). 
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gain a better footing in the market, thus improving the Trademark Potential 
and ultimately the Trademark Balance of a country.  In my view, altering 
the Trademark Balance through import substitution in developing countries 
necessitates overcoming various structural hurdles as to the impact of 
brands including inept laws, stagnation in industrial production, narrow 
economic outlooks, and education gaps. 
Indeed, in order to succeed in import substitution, it is imperative to 
gear national industry towards this end.  Import substitution requires a 
thorough review of import practices by developing countries.  They need to 
determine the exact nature of imports and to attempt to substitute such 
imports with local products bearing domestic brands.  This will contribute 
towards raising the Trademark Potential of the country and in improving 
its Trademark Balance. 
4.8 Prospects for Assistance by Other Entities 
Developing countries will, most likely, not be able to single-handedly 
amend their trademark régimes, especially in light of the current 
concentration of economic and political powers in the hands of Western-
Industrialized countries--namely the United States and some Western 
European countries.  For this reason, developing countries are in need of a 
“policy space” in order to strike a new balance with their respective 
national intellectual property systems.162  One study concludes that 
developing countries may gain a stronger footing in the reformulation of 
intellectual property standards by receiving assistance from other parties 
and by collaborating with each other.  Thus, the question that presents itself 
here is:  From whom can developing countries receive assistance in this 
regard?163 
 
 162. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 830 
(2007) (contending that if countries are to benefit from their intellectual property systems, 
they need to strike the right balance between proprietary interests and public access needs in 
their intellectual property system and to strike the right balance, countries need wide policy 
space—or, in political terms, autonomy and sovereign discretion--to design their intellectual 
property system); see also Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for 
Development, 4 (The Ctr. for Int’l Governance and Innovation, Working Paper No. 37, 
2008) (noting that the adoption of a “Development Agenda” by the WTO has given less 
developed countries a unique opportunity to reshape the international intellectual property 
system). 
 163. See Yu, Building International Property Coalitions for Development, supra note 
162, at 4 (finding that, by bringing countries together, “coalitions will have leverage that 
does not exist for each less developed country alone,” and, “if used strategically, they will 
allow less developed countries to shape a pro-development agenda, articulate more coherent 
positions, or even enable them to establish a united negotiating front.”).  Yu further found 
that these coalitions will “also help less developed countries establish a more powerful voice 
in the international debates on public health, intellectual property, and international trade,” 
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First, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) can play a vital 
supporting role for developing countries.  This is because various NGOs 
have demonstrated their ability to rally the masses and to influence Western 
public opinion.  Thus, a coordinated effort between developing countries 
and NGOs may ultimately tip the balance and allow for entering changes 
into the trademark régime.  However, despite the potential for such 
cooperation, its success is not assured because “these kinds of coalitions 
are difficult to put together, are issue specific and predominantly rely on a 
crisis of some kind to be truly effective.  They do not threaten the standard-
setting dominance of the US and EU, especially when these two states are 
united on the direction in which global regulation should travel.”164 
Similarly, the Council of TRIPS may be asked to play a more active 
role in addressing cases of excessive domination by foreign trademarks and 
service marks.  Article 68 of TRIPS allows member-states to consult on 
“matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights.”165  Article 71(1) of TRIPS also empowers the council to review the 
implementation of the agreement “in the light of any relevant new 
developments which might warrant modification or amendment of this 
[a]greement.”166  These authorities could be interpreted as granting the 
council the authority to inquire with states that are “seeking to raise 
intellectual property [protection] standards beyond those agreed to 
multilaterally.”167  In this type of review process, developing countries 
could initiate consultations regarding the effects of trademarks and their 
contribution to achieving real globalization and free trade.  Such a 
consultation process within the Council of TRIPS might revive the debate 
regarding the future form and content of TRIPS generally and trademarks 
specifically.168 
 
and that “instead of focusing on state-to-state relationships, less developed countries need to 
better understand the importance and challenges for working with non-governmental 
organizations and sub-state agents and within non-national systems.”  Id. at 10. 
 164. Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-setting, 5 J. WORLD INTEL. PROP. 765, 768 (2002). 
 165. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, Article 68 (“The Council for TRIPS shall 
monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in particular, Members’ compliance with their 
obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on matters 
relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.  It shall carry out such 
other responsibilities as assigned to it by the Members, and it shall, in particular, provide 
any assistance requested by them in the context of dispute settlement procedures.  In 
carrying out its functions, the Council for TRIPS may consult with and seek information 
from any source it deems appropriate.  In consultation with WIPO, the Council shall seek to 
establish, within one year of its first meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation with 
bodies of that Organization”). 
 166. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at Article 8. 
 167. Drahos, supra note 164, at 794. 
 168. See Ralph Cunningham, Policing the World of Intellectual Property, TRIPS 
Council–-Special Report, in WORLD IP CONTACTS HANDBOOK 18, 20-21 (2002) (explaining 
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In addition to the Council of TRIPS, the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (“TPRM”) might be another suitable forum in which 
developing countries can raise issues regarding possible distortions in trade 
that are being caused by the CTR.  TPRM might be petitioned in view of 
the aforementioned unilateralism by the US and EU.  Indeed, according to 
Drahos, TPRM has “broader implications for the stability of the WTO 
system.”169  Consequently, developing countries may initiate an in-depth 
review of the trade-related effects of trademark protection on their 
economies, imports, exports, industry, the consumer market, and the 
national culture. 
Developing countries might also elect to forge an economic-political 
alliance which would constitute a counter-balance to the influential “Quad” 
of industrialized countries that formulated TRIPS.170  Indeed, by pooling 
their efforts, developing countries should be more effective in amending 
their respective trademark régimes.  Such pooling of resources would allow 
developing countries to dispatch joint delegations that specialize in health, 
environment, law, trade, economics, and agriculture.  Indeed, some 
commentators blame this lack of coordination for the failure of developing 
countries in the negotiations leading up to TRIPS.171 
In addition, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
can play a crucial role in reviving the intellectual property debate.  This is 
in spite of the fact that developed countries have been successful in shifting 
the forum from WIPO to WTO-TRIPS.  WIPO commands substantial 
international respect and credibility that allows it to play a more effective 
role in revitalizing the debate over intellectual property and development, 
rather than just focusing on promoting intellectual property protection. 
4.9 The Challenge of Compatibility with TRIPS 
Many of the abovementioned proposed solutions within the middle 
ground approach could potentially clash with the principles underlying the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Indeed, it appears as though remedying some of the 
negative effects of TRIPS in the context of trademarks by providing 
 
that these conflicting positions are reported in a briefing note published by the WTO before 
the Ministerial Council that was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001). 
 169. Drahos, supra note 164, at 795.  This doubt surrounding the effectiveness of the 
TPRM in this context is more clearly apparent in view of the fact that the objectives of the 
TPRM include an “‘increased transparency and understanding of countries trade policies’ as 
well as ‘to create a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading 
system.’”  Id. (quoting the WTO Website). 
 170. See Drahos, supra note 164, at 794-795 (suggesting that the four countries that 
should form this counter-quad are India, Brazil, Nigeria, China). 
 171. See id. (noting that developing countries can join such a constellation and contribute 
their share within). 
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preferential treatment to brands originating in developing countries would 
clash with various norms prescribed by TRIPS, including the principles of 
National Treatment (Article 3) and Most Favored Nation (Article 4), which 
I have dealt with in Section Two above.  But in addition to these two 
hurdles, the TRIPS agreement presents other hurdles, including those 
appearing in articles 8 and 72 of that Agreement. 
Article 8(2) of TRIPS allows member-states to take measures against 
abuse of intellectual property right holders on the condition that “[such 
measures] are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”172  In 
other words, member-states can only maneuver “freely” within the 
parameters of measures that are prescribed by TRIPS.  In light of this 
limitation, it would be difficult to establish that trademark protection, as 
prescribed by TRIPS, would in fact result in the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or “unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology.”173  Consequently, there is a 
need to first recognize such a possibility by the TRIPS Agreement.  In this 
regard, Article 72 of TRIPS makes it exceedingly difficult for any member-
state to independently modify any of the TRIPS norms because it plainly 
states that “reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the 
provisions of this [a]greement without the consent of other Members.”174  
Understandably, such consent is not easy to come by.  Therefore, Article 72 
also needs to be amended in order to allow a member-state to enter 
unilateral reservations pertaining to the trademark régime where its national 
interests dictate this.  However, allowing this would effectively undermine 
the uniformity of TRIPS. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
In light of the Trademark Potential concept, it appears that presently, 
the CTR is beneficial to some countries and much less so to other 
countries.  Thus, although CTR is intended to provide equal protection to 
all brands, whether domestic or foreign, the equality in the commercial 
foothold of brands is not attained.  My previous research has demonstrated 
that the effects of the CTR on developing countries contribute towards 
creating a Trademark Deficit in those countries. 
In this research, I have explored various possible ways of modifying 
the CTR in developing countries that are also considered to be newcomers 
 
 172. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, at Article 8 (stating that “appropriate 
measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this agreement, may be 
needed to prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at Article 72. 
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in the brand-owning arena.  In other words, while the modern trademark 
régime contributes towards the entry of more foreign brands into 
developing countries, it does not, and cannot, sufficiently facilitate the 
creation of national brands therein.  Absent any intervention, the 
Trademark Deficit of these countries will be preserved. 
Consequently, I have introduced and examined new methods that are 
intended to offset the differences among countries.  Indeed, in view of this 
imbalance in the end-result and in order to remedy it, two possible courses 
of action for change come to mind.  The first avenue is that of delinking 
from the CTR.  In its most extreme form this might involve the abolition of 
the CTR in its entirety.  I have rejected this approach and asserted that it 
would be counter-productive to society at large.  I have also equally 
rejected the unequivocal support for the CTR because it fails to take into 
consideration the differences among different countries.  However, in the 
borderline between those two extremes I have identified and devised a host 
of amendments, which I have referred to collectively as the Neo-
Conventional Trademark Régime (“NCTR”).  In my view, the mechanisms 
that are included in the NCTR reflect the recognition that while trademark 
protection must be preserved, changes are required in order to assist 
newcomer states to effectively participate in the trademark game. 
In a nutshell, this research proposes various methods through which 
the existing Trademark Deficit of developing countries can be 
counterbalanced in a manner that might assist these newcomer countries to 
penetrate the seemingly impregnable wall that separates the “haves” from 
the “have-nots” in the trade-marking (branding) domain. 
 
